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INTRODUCTION

You think Wellington is a great general because
you
have been beaten by him. I tell you Wellington is
a
bad general
Napoleon
18 June 1815
.

.

Napoleon uttered those words to his chief of staff,
Marshal Soult* on 18 June 1815, the morning of the battle
of Waterloo. Mellowed but never cowed after his defeat at

that battle. Napoleon eventually allowed that, as a field
commander, Wellington was probably his equal,
the advantage of having more prudence.

".

.

.with

Napoleon's later

comments attest to an historical truth, that Field-Marshal
the Duke of Wellington was an outstanding general, perhaps

Britain's greatest field captain.
At the time Napoleon Bonaparte faced the Duke of

Wellington at Waterloo, the duke was the best military
commander in the world. In full command of the time-proven
elements of military success, the field marshal was also an
innovator. He displayed an exceptional grasp of all aspects
of campaign. A master of strategy, operations, tactics and

logistics, he broke with the accepted norms of the

profession to propose fitness regimens for his soldiers, and
to pursue tirelessly the acquisition of supplies and

materiel required for the well-being of his troops. One of
*Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult.

Wellington's most unusually profitable
qualities was his
ability to coalesce winning armies from
polyglot formations
that operated under vastly differing systems
and often

spoke

many different languages. Further, he dealt
with the twin
plagues of military operations, communication and
transportation, before he ever faced an enemy. The duke's

emphasis on protecting his soldiers by ensuring their

welfare coupled with his extensive preparations before
entering

a

conflict was the beginning of

a

British martial

renaissance that continued throughout the nineteenth
century. Soldiers will endure almost any hardship if their

commander cares about them and leads them to victory.

Wellington did just that, and inspired Captain John
Kincaid's comment: "We would rather see his long nose in

a

fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day."^
Of particular interest is the process of the duke's

military education. He was certainly

a

man of intellect and

keen insight, but commanders are made, not born. Like all
late eighteenth century officers, Wellington had to acquire
his expertise through study and experience. He applied

himself to that task in his typical fashion and excelled

beyond his colleagues to become a master of modern warfare.
He set himself apart from his brother officers by his

singular and total dedication to success.

2

There is no question that Sir Arthur
Wellesley*, the
Duke of Wellington, belongs to an
exclusive cotillion
of

military masters that stand apart from and
above most
generals; a small pantheon peopled by the
likes of

Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon. My purpose
is not to

reiterate Wellington's exploits in order to glorify
him.
That has already been done, many times, by many

others. The

goal of this essay is to examine how the

".

.

.quiet,

dejected and observant" boy of twelve, obsessed with his
violin, grew into the field marshal who defeated, most often
in the face of superior numbers, the vaunted Imperial French

army and, ultimately, Napoleon himself."

Arthur Wesley, he became Wellesley when his older
brother, Richard, changed the family name to Wellesley in 1798.
Arthur was not created Viscount Wellington until after the battle
of Talavera in 1809.
*Born

3

CHAPTER

1

TO COLONEL BY PURCHASE

Youth and Education

Arthur Wesley was born in Dublin on

1

May 1769.^

His

father, the second Lord Mornington, was an accomplished

musician but a poor financial manager. The passive and

unassuming youth took quickly to the music that his father
brought to the home and by age twelve Arthur showed real
promise on the violin. The Earl's early death in 1781 left
the family

".

.

.financially embarrassed" and the future

duke without a patron for his musical endeavors.^

Arthur's mother, Lady Mornington, was much more

pragmatic than her late husband and also less than fond of
her middle son. According to one biographer. Sir Herbert
Maxwell:

"It is believed that she disliked Arthur as a boy,

because of his slow, thick speech and dull manner, which
gave him an air of stupidity."^

With the help and approval

of Arthur's older brother, Richard, the Earl of Mornington,

Lady Mornington situated Arthur at Eton. While not

unsuccessful there, he showed no real promise and, as funds
were short and there were other more promising sons to
educate, she withdrew the future field marshal from Eton in

the summer of 1784, bemoaning Arthur's mediocrity and
4

apparent lack of drive:

"i

don't know what

I

shall do with

my awkward son Arthur."*
As a youth, then, the future Duke of
Wellington

displayed none of the qualities that would
so distinguish
him in later life. Frustrated with her son's
chronic

underachievement and worried about his prospects. Lady

Mornington complained that Arthur was
and nothing more."^

".

.

.food for powder

Accordingly, his mother began to steer

him toward the military, though the least attractive
of

possible careers, by enrolling him in the Royal Academy of

Equitation at Angers, in the present day department of
Maine-et-Loire, France. This preparatory institution, an

historic quasi-military school, continued the martial
traditions of old. In addition to equestrian and fencing
skills, the students also learned mathematics and

humanities.^
a

At the Royal Academy the young student gained

working knowledge of French,

a

knowledge that would serve

the future general well during his years facing Napoleon's
armies. Further, Wesley developed socially from the almost

painfully shy, lonely and clumsy youth into an engaging and
dynamic young man. Moreover, pale and often sickly, at

Angers he seems to have developed

a

more robust

constitution. In short, he excelled. It was as though he had

finally found his niche. The weak and diminutive young boy

who had entered the academy at Angers left it in late 1786,
a

robust seventeen year old brimming with confidence and

thoroughly steeped in the traditions
of old Europe. When his
mother first saw him she said:
"I do not believe there is
my ugly boy Arthur."^

Early Career

Britain's army officer corps has long been

a

repository

for the flotsam of the aristocracy, especially so
in the

latter eighteenth century. In this era a career in the army

was a last resort for many of offspring of the high born.

Entrance and promotion in the infantry and cavalry, based

neither on merit nor seniority, depended on the candidate's
ability to purchase

a

desired position and was, of course,

subject to all manner of corruption. Only the Ordnance
branches, artillery and engineers, differed, requiring
formal education and promotion based solely on seniority.*

Arthur Wesley entered into this system in 1787 when he
acquired an ensign's commission in the 73rd Highland
Regiment, purchased on his behalf by his older brother
Richard.
One would think that upon assumption of a commission,
an officer would commence formal military training and

education. Such was not the case in eighteenth century
Britain: Sandhurst, the royal military academy for the

training of officers, was not founded until 1801. Arthur was

not, at first, particularly enamored
of a military career

and thought of it as a stepping stone
to some other form of
honorable employment. Yet he seemed determined
to do well as
an officer. According to one story, upon
receiving his
ensign's commission he remarked,
".
.since I have
.

undertaken
it."^

a

profession

I

had better try to understand

To that end he purportedly had one of his privates

weighed, first without marching gear and then with full
kit.
When, in later years, an observer complimented his
foresight

Wellington replied:
believe that I owe most of my success to the
attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics
as a regimental officer. There were very few men in the
army who knew these details better than I did; it is
the foundation of all military knowledge. When you are
sure that you know the power of your tools and the way
to handle them, you are able to give your mind
altogether to the greater considerations which the
presence of the enemy forces on you.^°
I

Wesley's complicated promotion and transfer history
from his original date of commission,

7

March 1787, through

his lieutenant colonelcy, 30 September 1793, also seems to

reflect his determination to excel in his profession:
Promotion History:
Date

March 1787
25 December 1787
23 January 1788
25 June 1789
30 June 1791
31 October 1792
30 April 1793
30 September 1793
7

Regiment
73rd
76th
41st
12th
58th
18th
3 3rd
33rd

Foot
Foot
Foot
Lt Dragoons
Foot
Lt Dragoons
Foot
Foot

7

Rank
Ensign
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Captain
Captain
Major
Lieut. Colonel

Obviously he rose in rank relatively
rapidly while
alternating between the cavalry and the
infantry. His many
transfers would certainly stand him in good
stead in
the

future. Rarely could a junior officer claim
the breadth of
exposure to both mounted and infantry units apparent
in

Arthur's early years.
During those early years he served in mundane
assignments, most notably as aide-de-camp to Lord
Buckingham, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, from spring of
1788 to early 1794." Concurrent with his military service
in Ireland, Wesley also sat in the Irish Parliament as

member from the borough of Trim. Since he participated

actively as

a

member, his aide-de-camp duties did not seem

to overwhelm him. During his tenure in the Irish Parliament
he developed some public-speaking skills. According to one

anecdote, an observer asked the name of the young hook-nosed

member from Trim: "That," ''replied my friend,'

Wellesley [sic], a brother of Lord Mornington's
the aides-de-camp of the Lord Lieutenant."

never speaks,"

^I

added.'

"I

"is Captain
,

and one of

suppose he

"You are wrong; he does speak

sometimes, and when he does, believe me, it is always to the
purpose.

"^^

It appears that Parliamentary public speaking

served as the training ground for the future duke's
legendary economy of speech.

Arthur rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the
33rd regiment in December, 1793, the unit he would lead to
8

distinction in India, with that rank
Arthur assumed command
of a battalion. By that time
he seems to have changed his
plans about his future and decided that
his destiny lay in a
military career. To that end he burned
his violin, severing

with it most ties to his youth."

with no formal

preparation for command, Wellesley found himself
in charge
of almost 700 soldiers, and he steeled
his resolve to attain
military competence. His resolve almost coincided
with his
first taste of combat. In early 1794, Lieutenant
Colonel

Wesley and the 33rd Foot were attached to a contingent
under
Lord Francis Rawdon-Hastings

,

Earl of Moira, assigned to

relieve the distressed forces of the Duke of York, trapped
by the French in Flanders. The Gallic forces had invaded the

Low Countries after diplomatic relations between the French
and British had ended, in 1793, in acrimonious declarations
of war. Britain was understandably concerned for her own

security with the hostile army of revolutionary France so
close at hand.''

Thus, without benefit of training in

strategy, tactics or the operational art, Arthur now would
lead a battalion of soldiers in harm's way.

The reinforcing contingent landed in Flanders in the

summer of 1794.^^

For the British army and its commander

in chief, the Duke of York,

this campaign had failed in

every sense of the word. Outnumbered and cornered in the

hostile environs of Flanders, where Lord Moira had joined
it,

the army had retreated ignomiously into Holland. There

the incipient genius of the lieutenant
colonel of the 33rd
became obvious at an action at Boxtel.
Wesley fought a

successful infantry action against charging
French cavalry.
The disciplined and coordinated volley fire
of the
33rd's

muskets turned the French horsemen back.-

One can picture

Wesley's force, drawn up in line, holding fire
until

commanded to do so, a tactic he would so often use with
so
much success throughout his military career (though
hardly
his innovation). Later, from October 1794 through January
1795, Wesley, by then a nominal brigade commander, led the

rearguard of the retreating debacle that the British army in
Flanders had become by that time. Essentially forgotten
along the banks of the river Waal, Wesley and his brigade

held their position until ordered to withdraw in February
1795.

Important to the development of the future field
marshal during these dark days of retreat was his witnessing
the conditions endured by his troops. Much of Arthur's later

success owed to his detailed consideration for the welfare
of the rank and file, and his extensive preparations before
a

campaign to ensure that welfare. During the harsh winter

of 1794-1795, when the bulk of the British army had

retreated to winter quarters, Wesley's 33rd remained,
holding the rear under constant pressure.
said,

"The French," he

"keep us in a perpetual state of alarm, we turn out

once, sometimes twice, every night; the officers and men are

10

.

harassed to death.

.

.i

have not had the clothes off my back

for a long time and generally spend
the greater part of the
night upon the bank of the river.— Army
headquarters was
distant, inefficient and not too concerned
with the

rearguard:

"I was left there with my regiment.

miles from headquarters.

.and I do not think

.

once visited by the Commander-in-Chief."^^

.

I

.thirty

was ever

In 1839,

reminiscing with the Earl of Stanhope, Wellington damned
even more the command hierarchy in Flanders than he had

while serving there. Stanhope offered:
was,

I

"Your regiment, Sir,

believe, left for a long while on the Waal without

any order or direction?"

Wellington replied:

"Yes, the headquarters were twenty five miles
off. I was on the Waal, I think, from October to
January, and during all that time I only saw once one
general from the headquarters, which was old Sir David
Dundas.
.We had letters from England, and I
declare that those letters told us more of what was
passing at headquarters than we learned from the
headquarters themselves.
.The real reason I succeeded
in my own campaigns is because I was always on the
spot - I saw everything and did everything for
.

.

myself
The British government recalled the Duke of York, as

author of the military failure, and installed General Count

Walmoden as his successor. ^°

The Dutch campaigns of 1794-

1795 provided few British heroes. They did, however, give

Wesley his baptism of fire and exposed him to the
ineffective and incompetent command structure of his

country's military hierarchy and their ruinous policy of
neglecting the welfare of the common soldier. Arthur would
11

never countenance, during his later
commands, inadequate
food and shelter, poor communications,
no intelligence
apparatus, inadequate transport and
expending valuable and
limited resources transporting officers'
baggage.
His

Flanders service convinced Wesley that
the regiments were
sound but that British military leadership
was not up to the
task.^^

As an academy for a future field marshal
the Dutch

campaign was invaluable. During it Wesley developed
an
ability to lead large formations, indicative of
innate
leadership abilities. Outnumbered at Boxtel

,

he employed the

standard defense of volley fire but employed it so

effectively that he won the battle, one of the few bright
moments in an otherwise dismal campaign. That action and the
success of his rearguard along the river Waal testify to

a

superior military mind. But the failures of the campaign
impressed him as well. Wesley said it best himself:
I

learnt what one ought not to do, and that is always

something

"^^
.

12

"Why -

CHAPTER

2

APPRENTICESHIP IN INDIA

Destination:

Trifiia

Arthur Wesley returned to Britain, with his
tired but
largely unscathed regiment, in the early
spring of 1795.^
The abortive expedition to the Low Countries
must surely

have been a humbling experience, although the
lieutenant
colonel gained some experience of real value during
that

calamitous fiasco. With the burning of his violin, Arthur
had turned his back on his youth and applied himself

unsparingly to the profession that he now accepted as his
destiny. He saw his military service as a contribution to
the public good, an idea he held in high regard. He viewed
his entire career, after Holland, as selfless service to his

nation: he felt that he was

".

.

.retained for Life."^

He

had not merely endured his Dutch experience, he had "learnt

what one ought not to do."

After Holland, Wesley was a

changed man, serious and dedicated. Many noticed the

transformation and remarked about the perception and
intellectual alacrity of the

young veteran.

William Pitt

(the Younger) assessed the lieutenant colonel favorably:

have never met any military officer with whom it
is so satisfactory to converse. He states every
difficulty before he undertakes any service, but none
after he has undertaken it.^
I

Wesley reconstituted, refitted
and rested the 33rd and
by September, 1795, had assembled
it at Portsmouth. The
regiment was ordered to join Lieutenant
General Sir Ralph
Abercromby's expedition to the West
Indies.* This was not
the best of news, as service in
the Caribbean colonies was
frequently lethal in the late eighteenth
century,

particularly from disease. For example, of
the approximately
400 officers who took part in the capture of
Martinique in
1794, 197 died. Of that group, 27 were battle
casualties

while the balance succumbed to various tropical
diseases,

principally malaria.^ Nevertheless, Wesley and the
33rd
sailed in September only to be battered by

a

series of

storms that scattered the fleet and forced them to return
to
the refuge of their home ports. The reorganized force

departed again in December. Two months later they were again
blown back to England to await the kinder weather of spring.
In the interim, however,

the 33rd received new orders that

diverted them from Abercromby's force and detailed them for
duty in India.
Even though Wesley had looked forward to service with

Abercromby, the change in orders was an event of real

fortune for the future field marshal. The difference between

duty in the colonial Americas and the East Indies was, as
Lady Longford aptly phrased it, the difference between

entering

"the white man's graveyard,"

the treasure-house of the Orient."''
15

and stepping "into

Additionally, Wesley,

never of truly robust health,
had suffered serious illness
from the constant exposure to
the harsh Dutch winter of the
preceding year, 1794-95. Although he
could not know it,
Arthur's future was certainly much
brighter because of the
change in orders which gave him
additional time to bolster
his physical status as well as
providing a less virulent
destination. More importantly, India would
be the classroom
for a field marshal that the Atlantic
colonies could never
have been.
The reason for the 33rd's assignment to India
was to

reinforce the forces of the East India Company against
possible (probable?) French activity there. As a result
of
the War of the Austrian Succession and, subsequently,
the

Seven Years War, France had lost much prestige and
position
in India. Treaty provisions had allowed the French to

maintain small, unfortified trading ports but the French

military presence had been largely eradicated. The new
French republic had sharply repulsed the attack of the

European monarchies that followed the Reign of Terror of
1794 and was now fully prepared to flex her imperial muscles

again. Indeed, French activity in India, especially in

Mysore, had been increasing for several years. Perceiving

this threat, the East India Company requested reinforcement
from London which, in turn, dispatched Wesley and his
regiment, among others.

16

colonel Wesley arrived at Fort
William, in Calcutta,
the seat of the British governor
general, in February 1797.
During the voyage Arthur had received
word of his brevet
promotion to colonel. He had also become
a student of India
and advanced military science. That
is, when Arthur finally
accepted the military as a career (see
page
7,

above), he

did it thoroughly, immersing himself in
the details of his
profession. He firmly believed that he could
overcome the

professional indolence of his early years and, by
his own
efforts, learn how to become a great commander.
Before he

departed England he had purchased a considerable
personal
library, not restricted to drill manuals. It included
world
and Indian atlases, histories of India and British

adventures therein, primers on the languages of the

subcontinent as well as works by Adam Smith, Voltaire,

Rousseau and Frederick the Great.®
Physically rejuvenated and intellectually exercised
upon arrival. Colonel Wesley made

a

very fine impression on

Sir John Shore, the governor general:

"If Colonel Wellesley

[sic] should ever have the opportunity to distinguish

himself, he will do it greatly."'

After their meeting, and

at Sir John's insistence, the military planners at Fort

William included Wesley in a fledgling plan to attack
Manila. The East India Company was concerned that the

presence of the Spanish, a French ally, in the Philippines

constituted a threat to Company commerce and security and

had urged the attack on those
grounds, it was clear that sir
John held Wesley in high regard;
so much so that the colonel
believed that he would be named
commander of the
expeditionary force:
"since my last an expedition to
Manilla [sic] has been talked of,
upon which I am to go, and

believe to have command of the corps
furnished by this
settlement."- This letter, like the rest
of Wesley's
correspondence of spring, 1797, makes it clear
that he was
I

an ambitious man, anxious to do great
things.

In the event,

the more senior Major General John St.
Leger commanded the

expedition, which included the disappointed Wesley,
when it
sailed in August 1797. The setback presaged what
the colonel

would often face in the future in India,

a

buffeting among

the three forces of bureaucratic preference for
his

services, military seniority technicalities and his own

belief that he could accomplish absolutely anything.'^
Once aboard the ships bound for Manila, Wesley

continued his now-established practice of looking after the
welfare of his troops, down to the smallest detail. Custom

dictated that, while aboard, the ship's naval officers would
have charge of the embarked soldiers. Freed of their
charges, the array officers could retire to their cabins to

endure the voyage as best they could. Wesley refused to

adhere to that custom, taking it upon himself instead to
attend to his regiment. Probably his position as

18

a

colonel

India

19

in a regular British unit
(as opposed to a unit of the
East
India Company) as well as his
favorable standing with Sir

John permitted this unorthodox
abrogation of custom.- The
colonel particularly worried that
the 33rd, trained to

precision during their five months ashore,
would be
hopelessly out of condition when they
reached Manila. For
twenty of the previous twenty-seven
months they had traveled
as passengers on eighteenth-century
British troop
transports."
Revolutionary, especially in the British army of
1797,
were Wesley's "Regimental Orders for on Board
Ship"."
They reflected the commander of the 33rd's
effort to occupy
his troops fully during the tedious voyage from
Calcutta to

Manila by way of Penang,

a

settlement on the Malay

peninsula. The painstaking detail of the thirty-six dicta

addressed such areas as physical fitness regimens, sleeping
hours, guard duties, musketry practice and specific details
of personal hygiene and ventilation of living spaces.

Wesley mandated inspections and foul weather procedures, and
he firmly controlled the distribution of spirit rations. As

one would expect, when the

3

3rd disembarked during the

layover in Penang it was fit and ready to conduct
operations. To maintain that fitness the colonel did not let
his soldiers idle their time away ashore. On the contrary,
the 33rd began intensive parade and drill maneuvers to

20

compensate for the United
opportunities to do so on the
voyage.
The actions of this young
regimental commander during
the voyage speak of an understanding
and experience far
beyond his years. The officer who
prepared the thirty-six
regimental orders of July 1797 was a
demonstrably concerned
and caring leader, it behooves
every officer to preserve the
fighting strength of his command but
Wesley's style of
leadership was certainly not characteristic
of the army
during this period. By his measures he
brought much extra
work upon himself and likely, because
his measures required
extra work for his regiment as well, provoked
grumbling in
the ranks and among his officers. Yet the net
result far

outweighed the cost because the

3

3rd was always healthy and

combat ready. The colonel who dictated the regimental
orders

foreshadowed the field marshal who wrote his own rules
within the context of service to the public good.

Portent of Greatness

Disappointment at the failed prospect of command of the
Manila expedition was short-lived, because the governor
general recalled the force before it reached its

destination. At best of dubious conception, the expedition's

departure left the East India Company in a perilously weak

defensive state, especially
in view of the newly-resurgent
French republic. Accordingly,
while in Penang, the force
received orders to return and
it arrived in Calcutta in
December 1797.

After situating his regiment in
Bengal, with, of
course, specific drilling and
training instructions. Colonel
Wesley, from January through March
1798, performed an
extensive reconnaissance of the battlefields
of southern
India." He had studied India extensively
during the
voyage from Britain.- He knew France and
Britain had
fought with each other on the subcontinent
throughout much
of the eighteenth century and that France
was anxious to
renew her claims there. In anticipation that the
conflict
might erupt again, he wished to see for himself the
land he

might soon have to traverse with an army.
The colonel focused his reconnaissance efforts on the
Carnatic, Mysore and Hyderabad. Those south-central regions

were the most probable locales for any future Anglo-French

hostilities in India because of the ever-increasing French
presence in Mysore. Anti-British sentiment ran high in

Mysore as

a

result of General Cornwallis'* defeat of the

Sultanate of Mysore under Tipoo Sultan in 1791-92.^''

Tipoo

had not accepted his defeat and subsequent territorial
losses gracefully. He had not come to realize the benefits

*General Charles
Marquis Cornwallis.

Cornwallis,

second

Earl

and

first

of British suzerainty.
Patiently biding his time before

seeking revenge, he brought into
his army French armaments
and officers.- By 1798 he
possessed a formidable and
hostile force officered in many
cases by French
professionals."
Because of the potential volatility
in Mysore, Wesley
spent the preponderance of his
reconnaissance there. British
military endeavors in that region, while
on the whole
successful, had also seen reverses, notably
the destruction
of Colonel William Baillie's force of
some 4,000 troops on
10 September 1780.-

Wesley resolved to avoid repeating

past errors. To that end he traced Cornwallis'
successful

march on Seringapatam, Tipoo's capital. =^
Colonel Wesley made two significant determinations

during his sojourn. First, he found that the established
passes through the mountains to reach the tableland of
Mysore, those most commonly traveled and that Cornwallis had
used, were covered by potentially hostile fortifications.

The colonel then discovered many other smaller, but

nevertheless passable, secondary routes through the
mountains which troops and cavalry could use. Cornwallis,
without the luxury of advanced inspection of the area of
operations, had not been aware of them, or if he had, had

chosen to ignore them. Wesley would not.
Colonel Wesley also determined that considerable

advantage would go to the British if their armies could

.

assei^ble and move through
the Baramahal with impunity.

Transit through Baramahal, an
area between the Carnatic a nd
Mysore, was unavoidable to any
force bent on Seringapatam.
The security of that region
would eliminate the constant
threat to the supply lines that
had caused General

Cornwallis to establish Bangalore as
a satellite logistical
base. Arthur believed that the
quiescence of Baramahal,

preferably by cooperation but forcibly
if necessary, was
essential to the success of any operation
against the
Mysorean capital."
Wesley's analysis, offering no more than one
would
expect of any competent staff officer today,
was remarkable
for its time. His very presence in Mysore
indicated a keen

analytical mind at work, the planning of

a

brilliant officer

for future contingencies. He examined, in minute
detail, the

routes, terrain, forage and water supplies of the area.

No

one else, not even one of the several senior generals, had

performed

a

similar reconnaissance or directed that one be

completed. Of the future duke's penchant for tireless

preparation. Colonel G.F. Henderson, a noted historian of
the British army, wrote:

"Do we always remember that it was

by hard work, in peace as well as in war, by devotion to

duty in its highest sense, by doing whatsoever his hand
found to do with all his might.

himself

]
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.[that he distinguished

Preparation

nnri

pjrst

Anl-i

on

A ship sailing up the Hooglie to
Fort William, in
Calcutta, in the spring of 1798
brought with it an important
agent of imperial expansion in India,
Arthur's older
brother, Richard. The Earl of Mornington
became the
Governor-General of India in April.- Arthur
had
previously urged his brother to come to India,
wishing to
see him in the position of governor
general. In July of 1797
he had reminded Richard of a previous
letter that had asked

him to "Look to the Government of this Country."

The

colonel had continued:
am glad to find that there is so near a
prospect of my wishes upon that subject being
accomplished. I am convinced that you will retain your
health; nay, it is possible that its general state may
be mended; and you will have the fairest opportunities
of rendering material services to the public, and of
doing yourself credit, which, exclusive of other
personal considerations should induce you to come
I

out.=^

Now Mornington had come, bringing with him new direction
for the British in India, and a new name as well, Wellesley,
an older version of the family name. Mornington had

resurrected it for some rather convoluted personal
reasons.^*

Arthur cooperated with Richard's titular

eccentricities and adopted the name. His first
correspondence with Wellesley as his signature is in

a

letter of 19 May 1798, to S.R. Lushington, secretary to
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Lieutenant General George Harris,
the Commander in Chief and
acting Governor of Fort George,
the seat of the Madras
presidency .^^
Mornington's goals were more ambitiously
imperialist
than those of his predecessors. As
historian Jac Weller
wrote:
"Mornington may have come out with a
master plan for
expansion in the back of his mind."A new breed of
colonialist, Richard, like Arthur, believed
public service a
noble vocation, especially in a colony
like India.
He also

believed it his duty to improve the lot of
the Indians by
instituting British administrative and government
structures. Mornington (and Colonel Wellesley)
thought that
the Indians could only thrive under British
rule, and he

hoped to expand the boundaries of that rule.
An increased French presence in Mysore blocked that

expansion. The Europe that the earl had just left was rife

with French victories as the new republic had lashed out at
the old monarchies that had tried to forcibly maintain the

status quo of the Ancien Regime.

In the ascendant, the

armies of the republic, and their emerging genius, Napoleon,

were the single strongest military power of continental
Europe, a formidable instrument of the expansion-minded

republic. France was reasserting a military presence in

India and Tipoo's recent agreement with the French governor
at Mauritius posed a serious threat to Mornington's plans.

Tipoo's open hostility to the British made settlement, at

,

least on British terms,
impossible. The earl entered into
pro forma negotiations with
Tipoo in 1798 only in order to
buy time while he cemented
alliances and built up forces for
an attack on Mysore. The
most important alliance would be
with Hyderabad. It derived its
political and strategic
importance from its proximity to
Mysore and from its large
army which, like that of Mysore,
was French-led.-

Politically hostile because of years
of poor treatment by
the East India Company, the Nizam of
Hyderabad preferred an
alliance with the French.-

Mornington's diplomatic

maneuvers, called brilliant by some, resulted
in the nizam
coming instead to an accord with the British.
A treaty

between the Company and the nizam, signed on

1

September

1798, called for all French officers to be replaced by
East

India Company officers.^^

Furthermore, thnizam agreed not

only to enter into an accord with the British but also
to
ally with them against Tipoo.

Throughout the summer and autumn of that year, the
Company concentrated ever greater numbers of troops in
Madras. Colonel Wellesley and his regiment formed part of

that buildup. The regiment embarked aboard the Fitz-William
in August. On the way from Calcutta to Madras the ship

struck a reef and almost foundered. Fluky winds also delayed
its progress so that the voyage required over three weeks.

Worse, the drinking water aboard was contaminated, further

shaking Wellesley's already poor opinion of military
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provisioners. Most of the 33rd
experienced some level of
illness, generally dysentery,
but several soldiers died.
Wellesley thought it "very
inconsistent with the principles
of the Christian religion to
give people bad water when
[Captain Frazer] had notice of the
probability that it woul d
be so."" In spite of those
difficulties, the 33rd arrived
in Madras and Wellesley led his
men from there to Vellore,
the city on the Baramahal border
that was the main staging
area for the grouped battalions.
By the end of December 1798, a considerable
force had

assembled in and around Madras. When Arthur
arrived, he
contributed significantly to planning the move
against
Mysore. His experience gained during his
reconnaissance and
his reputation for tactical thought made him a
valued
contributor. The plan that finally emerged called for a two-

pronged attack. General Harris would march against the
Sultanate from the east while Lieutenant General James
Stuart would come down from Bombay and strike from the west.
The planners intended the forces to converge simultaneously
on Seringapatam, Tipoo's capital and main citadel.

At this point someone else's tragedy turned into

Wellesley 's good fortune. Colonel Henry Harvey Ashton, the
commander of the brigade of which Wellesley's 33rd formed
part, was killed in a duel in mid-December.^"

Wellesley

and Ashton had worked together for months preparing the
plans for the Mysore campaign and had held each other in
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a

mutual high regard. The survivor
deeply regretted his
superior's death. Honored to receive
Ashton's fine Arabian
stallion, Diomed, as a bequeathal,
Wellesley also took over
the brigade." "i have taken
comnand of the troops.'-, he
noted on 20 December.^*
As acting brigadier and the senior
commander present
(General Harris and his principal
subordinate commanders had

remained in Madras), Wellesley began
organizing the mass of
troops at Vellore. The task of assigning
bivouac areas,
guard responsibilities, and similar issues,
was relatively
easy to accomplish. Overcoming the logistical
problems,
however, presented much more of a challenge.
The necessity
of acquiring sufficient victuals, forage,
supply and

transport, long the bane of armies, had bedeviled
Cornwallis

during the campaign of 1791.^^

They now promised to make

the campaign of 1799 a nightmare. Until relatively recently,

most generals disdained the unglamorous world of logistics
as not the business of officers and gentlemen. Wellesley was

not like most generals. Always concerned for the welfare of

his soldiers, at Vellore he would show how innovation and

desire could overcome many of the problems imposed by
logistical limitations. Obviously a mere colonel could not
remake the army establishment or create an efficient

commissary corps. He could, however, assess the problem and,
with the benefit of his preparation, find a solution to it.

Wellesley's knowledge of the history of British armies in

:

India and his recollection
of the entrepreneurial nature
of
the merchants in the bazaars
of Madras helped him greatly.
Cornwallis had used the bri;. jarries
wholesale grain
merchants, to transport rice for his
force during his second
march on Seringapatam in 1792."
Wellesley adopted that
novel approach but modified it slightly
in that instead of
using the bri^jarries as bearers of
rice as Cornwallis had,
he used them as purveyors, merchants
of rice. This gave the
brinjarries a vested interest in maintaining
the security of
the rice because they had a financial stake
in it. Further,
,

Wellesley lured groups of merchants and craftsmen
from the
bazaars of the cities to accompany the expeditionary

force.

This second group provided the army and the camp followers

with goods and services of every description. Finally,

Wellesley started

a

process of gradually hiring transport

services, especially transport by bullocks, as they were the

most adaptable to overland campaigns.^'

His preparations

were thorough and complete. They also proved advantageous to
the campaign because the brinjarries and bazaars, while

adding to the mass that had to move cross country, cost the
East India Company nothing. Not only did the merchants have
a financial interest in the efficient and honest conduct of

commerce but the bazaar merchants also provided services

unheard of in a travelling army. As one Wellington scholar
observed
If and when the army advanced west, these bazaars
would go too and at their own expense and
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responsibility This system of
as the East and more efficient merchandising was as old
than it seems to
An
contained merchants who c^^ld supply*
^?ce"oth^'''
""^^^^"^ ^^^^ ^^er^ were
craftsmen caDablfo?'^
°^ making a soup tureen from silver
coin o^^o^^
^^P^^^i'^g a fine pistol by adding a ncwxy
newly
fn^nJf
forged mainspring
. ''°

colonel Wellesley's preparations
during his two months as
senior commander in Vellore put the
army on a sound
logistical footing.

General Harris, well pleased with the young
brigade
commander, told Mornington about Arthur's
"masterly

arrangements in respect to supplies."-

At the same time

Harris assured Arthur's brother that he would
like to praise
Wellesley publicly (usually accomplished via published
general orders) for his achievements at Vellore but
was

concerned that if he did so others might become
.

.displeased and jealous.

"*=

Wellesley, himself, grew

angry at General Harris' reticence. He felt that his

position and achievement deserved public recognition, that
he had done more than merely exploit advantages provided by

his brother, the governor general. Prudently, the young

colonel kept his anger in check except for a minor outburst
in a letter to Richard:

The General expressed his approbation of what I
had done, and adopted as his own all the orders and
regulations I had made, and then said that he should
mention his approbation publicly, only that he was
afraid others would be displeased and jealous. One of
these others. General Floyd,* had been in a similar
situation with mine, but his army was starving: he had

Major General James Floyd

^^^'^^
Madras,
latterly by me from my own

VeUore'^^^nf Z''^"*
camp?

'

As in fact there is nothing to
be qot from the
army but credit, and as it is
not always the best
to serve the public succeed,
i? Ts i°"H
when they do succeed they should not
receLp
approbation which it is
th^v
they deserve. I was much hurt about acknowledged by all
it at the^ime! but
^^^^^ certainly continue to do
Lt^^^l,
t
everything
to serve General Harris, and support^
his
fh^-l
name and authority
.

By late January 1799, the "unappreciative"
Harris

commanded

a

force of 32,000.-

the nizam's army, which needed

Half of it, however, was
a

firm but diplomatic

liaison/leader if it was to operate in concert with the
British. Colonel Ashton had earlier filled that role,

combining the finesse needed to manage the personalities of
another man's army with the necessity for solid, dependable
service."^

Now the duty fell to Wellesley, which

occasioned an uproar of protest from more senior officers
who believed themselves better qualified than the governor

general's brother. Their discovery that Meer Allum, the
nizam's son and field commander, had personally requested
Wellesley, however, muted the protest.**
On

3

February 1799, Harris' huge force, made all the

larger by the camp following that included the brinjarries
and the bazaars, began its westward movement. The "ponderous

machine" carried with it most of the victuals required for
human consumption even though it depended upon the

countryside to provide the forage for its 15,000 horses and

over 100,000 bullocks.-

it would obviously take a

considerable supply of forage to sustain
that many animals
on the march to Seringapatam.
Tipoo, of course, realized
this British weakness. He had seen it
before and learned
from it. The sultan tried to destroy
anything that could
sustain the British in their march. He managed

to lay waste

only the countryside along the probable
route of march,
however, because he lacked the manpower to
cover

all the

other routes into Mysore. This was the benefit
Wellesley had
foreseen in the control of Baramahal. Harris, by a series
of

radical and unpredictable turns, abandoned the shortest
route, which Tipoo had rendered untenable, and moved his

army through unspoiled land. Between Harris' maneuvers and

Wellesley's grain (rice) stockage measures the force moved
steadily, albeit circuitously

,

toward Seringapatam, as

February gave way to March.

Wellesley first skirmished with Tipoo's troops on 10
March. As General Harris moved deeper into Mysore, enemy

cavalry grew increasingly bold in harassing the British
columns. On the 10th, Wellesley's advance guard encountered
a

column of 2,000 enemy cavalry. The acting brigadier sent

forward two 6-pounders with the pickets. The grape from
these field pieces rent huge holes in the Mysorean cavalry.

Wellesley then led a cavalry charge that dispersed the
remainder of the enemy column. In this first action his
force suffered 57 casualties to Tipoo's 500 or so.*"

Harris' force continued to creep
forward without
meeting any significant opposition.
But when on 26 March it
entered an open plain six miles
east of the settlement of
Malavelley, it confronted a massive
concentration of Tipoo's
troops and artillery. Harris made
camp and prepared to
engage the sultan. Early the next
morning the British force
moved toward the enemy. Tipoo's artillery
began firing.
Harris, anxious to close with his foe,
urged his men on. His
main army was positioned on the right,
Wellesley and the
nizam's army on the left. He then ordered his
acting

brigadier to attack Tipoo's right and try to turn
that
flank. As the British columns struggled forward
Tipoo sent
an infantry column of between 2,000 and 3,000 to
check the

advance. ^°

Now Tipoo would test the value of Wellesley's

six years of drill and practice with the 33rd. Arthur

ordered his regiment, the lead unit of the nizam's army, to
move from column to line as they approached

a low ridgeline.

It executed the maneuver flawlessly, moving obliquely across

the crest of the ridge until the men presented two long

ranks of approximately 350 infantrymen each to the

approaching enemy. The Company units that marched behind the
33rd duplicated the maneuver, falling in behind the

redcoats. Tipoo's force, still in column, continued to close

with the British, now stationary in line. The regulars

watched their enemy approach until, at 60 yards Wellesley
commanded:

"Thirty-third, make ready! Fire!"^^
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The volley

Of 700 British muskets
shattered the leading Mysorean
columns. The troops behind them
could not continue the

advance because the bodies of
those killed by British volley
fire impeded their forward
progress. The 33rd, however,
rose, presented bayonets and
marched forward with the steady
precision of the parade ground. The
awesome spectacle of

unbroken ranks of regulars coming straight
at them with cold
steel proved too much for the Mysoreans.
They broke and ran.
Malavelley lives prominently in only two
histories: one
by General Harris and one by Wellesley.
For General Harris
it foreshadowed the successful outcome
of a distinguished
career. For Wellesley it was his first real
battle, and, as
it turned out, a defensive one. Wellesley's
700 musketeers

faced and repulsed

a

force at least three times their

number. To do so, their commander used the double-rank line

formation utilizing disciplined and effective volley fire.
The future field marshal seems to have possessed an instinct
for brilliant defense, as Malavelley had just shown, and as

the later efforts in Iberia would demonstrate. His defensive

maneuver, however, did not accord with the preferred British

tactic in India, the raid, a violent and unexpected attack,

almost always against a foe with superior numbers."

This

tactic kept the Indian armies of the various princes,

usually larger than those of the Company, from being

concentrated and ready. The action could happen at any time
and from almost any direction, necessitating the dispersal

of princely forces and
effectively neutralizing their

numerical superiority.

Wellesley had studied the tactics
of the earlier
campaigners and was familiar with these
audacious attacks
that seemed to work so well. He had
observed that, once the
raids disrupted the enemy, the British
and Company troops
usually carried the battle, inferiority
of numbers
notwithstanding, as a result of their martial
ferocity. The
lesson, for him then, was to capitalize
on the disruption
caused by the raid by establishing a defensive
line. He

demonstrated this hybrid of the raid at Malavelley.
Usually
the British had rushed toward the enemy in
column, then

waited until the enemy deployed before the redcoats
formed
line. Then, three files deep, they used volley musket
fire

and cannon to destroy the enemy formations.

Wellesley, however, deployed in line and awaited the
enemy still coming forward in column, and chose to form two
lines instead of three. The conventional wisdom of the later

eighteenth century, in the armies of Great Britain, France
and Prussia, dictated line formations with three ranks or
files.

Two basic arguments favored the three-deep

formation. First, generals feared that in the heat of
battle, the first rank would suffer so many casualties that
the second rank, standing alone, could not provide a

sufficient volume of fire. Second, if the first rank was
depleted too much, it would not be able to form an effective

.

square, the only sound defense
against cavalry attacks si nee
no horse would charge a
sea of bayonets. Wellington had
ignored the conventional wisdom
because he had discovered
that the British in India did
not usually encounter the
massive volumes of fire that they
would face in Europe.
Also, Wellesley's 33rd was an
exceptionally well-led and

disciplined unit. The best way to take
care of your troops,
he believed, was to prepare them
properly
for battle.

Wellesley's exacting training regimen proved
its worth at
Malavelley. The 33rd delivered three to four
rounds per
minute against an enemy incapable of answering
it.^^

As a

result, he never needed to worry about forming
square

against

a

cavalry charge that never took place.

Malavelley is not listed in the regimental honors of
the

3

3rd, but perhaps it should be.

It was the place where

the future Duke of Wellington applied his self-taught

tactics, training and discipline to excellent effect. While
he had been shot at in anger, he had never before led troops
in battle save for the defensive rearguard action at Boxtel

five years earlier. After Malavelley, Arthur could boast of

having commanded 16,000 men in combat. Certainly it requires
great skill to manage that number of soldiers, who spoke
several different languages, in the chaos of battle with

only the most rudimentary communication system. As a portent
of future coalition generalship and coolness in combat, this

action established the famous Wellington modus operandi

A Sobering Rf^vprc^^i

Tipoo fell back to his fortified
capital in the first
days of April following the setback
at Malavelley. General
Harris' army plodded after him and,
on 4 April 1799, made
camp two miles south of Seringapatam.Now they prepared
to assault it. Wellesley had helped
formulate the British
plan of attack, it intended that the
armies, which

approached from the east, would bypass the city
to the south
and assemble in a fortified camp to the west.
General
Stuart's force, approaching from the west would
continue

straight toward the citadel and camp on the north bank
of
the Cauvery River (see map

,

page 39). Colonel Wellesley

would situate the Nizam's army to the south and assume

responsibility for pickets to the south and east. From these
three camps the British would move against the city. They

would not besiege it in the formal sense of the word, but

would batter the walls and gates and follow with

a

rapid

attack combining assault and escalade. Sieges in India were

frequently of short duration because the brittle walls of
the fortresses usually succumbed quickly to the heavy shot
of the British siege guns, few as they might number.

Tipoo, anticipating Harris' plan, erected partial

fortifications between the fortress and an aqueduct that

meandered north toward the Cauvery and then south. Harris
needed to clear the area, all the way to the South Cauvery
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River, before he could assault
the city. The British general
planned to take the area up to
the aqueduct first, and
afterwards the zone between the
aqueduct and the Little
Cauvery. Because he lay closest
to it, Wellesley had the job
of clearing the Sultanpettah
tope, a thicket of cocoa,
bainboo and betel. Harris wanted
this grove taken because it

supposedly

it."-

"had parties of men with arms assembling
on

Concurrent with Wellesley's activity,

a

party

would move out from the Harris camp to
secure the northern
end of the aqueduct. Both assaults would
take place after

dark

Wellesley did not like the situation. He would have
to
approach a thicket which probably concealed a large force
without having first reconnoitered it and without benefit
of
any intelligence concerning its strength. He recommended
as
an alternative, taking the ends of the aqueduct and pinching

off the tope:

Upon looking at the Tope as I came in just now, it
appears to me that when you get possession of the bank
of the Nullah [watercourse of the aqueduct], you have
the Tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the
rear of the former. However, you are the best judge,
and I will be ready. ^®

Wellesley's last statement, indicative of an obedient
subordinate, sealed his fate. General Harris ordered the

attack and, against his better judgment, Wellesley complied

with the order.
As darkness settled in, Wellesley's force, with the
3

3rd in the van, moved forward over the elevated

Seri ngapatam
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watercourse. The appearance of the
redcoats startled the
Indian pickets who hurried back
into the tope. Then its

defenders began showering their attackers
with rockets,
which they would continue to do
sporadically throughout the
inky black night. The darkness, the
rocket
attack, and the

thick jungle confused the British who
groped forward without
knowing where they were or where the enemy
awaited
them. In

the confusion, Wellesley lost touch with
his units. Soon,

discipline broke and, in disarray, the redcoats
retreated
piecemeal from the tope. Wellesley related the incident

to

his brother thus:
On the night of the 5th we made an attack upon the
enemy's outposts, which, at least on my side, was not
quite so successful as could have been wished. The fact
was that the night was very dark, that the enemy
expected us, and were strongly posted in an almost
impenetrable jungle. We lost an officer killed, and
others and some men wounded (of the 33rd); and at last,
as I could not find out the post which it was desirable
I should occupy, I was obliged to desist from the
attack, the enemy also having retired from the post.^'
A visibly-upset Wellesley returned to General Harris'

headquarters about midnight after he had done everything
possible to recover his dead and wounded. Harris heard him
out and noted later in his diary that the failure of the

33rd must have been "particularly unpleasant" for its

colonel

During this unfortunate affair, Wellesley had suffered
13 dead and eight men taken prisoner by the Mysoreans. The

bodies of the prisoners were later found. They had been
41

tortured and killed, some by
having nails driven through
their Skulls.- Wellesley
must have been shocked at this
reversal. He knew every one of
the 680 men in his regiment
by name. He took full
responsibility for the casualties, the
prisoners and the failure. He wrote
to the brother
of a

lieutenant killed in the bungled
assault:

can offer you no consolation upon this
melancholy occasion. To inform you that
your
distinguished himself in the affair in which brother
he lost
his life; that in others, in which I
have
engaged during this war, he had conducted seen him
himself to my
satisfaction; that as an officer I had always,
and
particularly that I had latterly, reason to be
with him; will only add to the grief with which pleased
you and
your family must naturally be affected. 62
I

The next day another unit took the tope. The city

Itself fell

a

month later, on

4

May. Wellesley came away

from the affair sobered but not defeated. He resolved not to

commit the same error again.

"I have come to a

determination," he said on 18 April, 1799,

"when in my

power, never to suffer an attack to be made by night upon an

enemy who is prepared and strongly posted, and whose posts
have not been reconnoitered by daylight.

"^^

Arthur would

engage in few night actions thereafter. He would also be
sure never to lose touch with his command, to let it wander

aimlessly, as had happened at the tope. He had learned

another valuable lesson, at

a

cost of 21 casualties.
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Assaye

The fall of Seringapatam brought
the Mysore campaign
to a successful conclusion.
After the city fell, Wellesley
became governor of it and, shortly
afterward, of the whole
of Mysore.- During his tenure,
he conducted a series of
offensive operations against minor
potentates which
maintained peace in the interest of uninterrupted
commerce:
against Dhoondia Waugh, June through September
1800; the
Rajah of Bullum, January and February 1802;
actions to quell
the rebellions in Wynaad, 1802; the Peshwa
Campaign and the

Mahratta War, February 1803 through June 1804.
This series of campaigns fully matured Wellesley as

a

brigade and division commander. The longer he remained in
charge the more mobile and audacious his expeditions became.

Although he did not enjoy the luxury of numerical
superiority, he was never again repulsed as he had been at
the Sultanpettah tope (he assiduously avoided

unreconnoitered night actions).
The last of his operations against the Mahrattas in the

Mahratta War offered him the chance to display to the
fullest, his tactical genius in battle. His greatest victory

came at Assaye, a battle of offensive maneuver, wherein the
British, after a long day of marching, encountered

a

strong,

stationary enemy force that far outnumbered the redcoats.
The Mahrattas were, after the destruction of Tipoo's

sultanate, the most powerful
group in India." Jealous of
British success in Mysore, and
the subsequent East India
company presence there, they
began to feel themselves
threatened. Unlike the Mysoreans,
the Mahrattas were not
united, although they shared a
common dislike for the
British. That dislike spawned a
concomitant interest in
securing French military assistance.
When the leaders of the
various Mahratta groups appealed to the
French government
for aid, the British believed they had
to nip this threat to
British suzerainty in the bud. The Mahratta
war began.

Wellesley, now a major general, led an army of
two

divisions through the Mahratta territory from August
through
December 1803.- He commanded one of the divisions
himself
and entrusted the other to Lieutenant Colonel James

Stevenson. Stevenson, a favored subordinate of long
standing, was familiar with the Wellesley methods of

operation. Throughout the spring and summer of 1803 the two

division commanders had worked well, operating in parallel,
and had enjoyed much success. On 21 September the two met at

Budnapoor to consider future plans.
Their chief opponent, a Mahratta leader, Scindia, whom

they believed encamped to their north near Borkardan,

commanded a formidable

array.

His regular infantry, led by

Europeans, probably numbered about 15,000.^''

He also had

some 10,000 to 20,000 additional infantry, but these men

were not officered by professionals and were less reliable
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as soldiers than were the
regulars. Scindia's cavalry

numbered between 30,000 and
60,000. But since he
concentrated on developing an
infantry force he had

neglected training his cavalry.
Their numbers were
impressive, but not their martial
skills, in addition to
this mass of at least 55,000
troops, Scindia also had a
powerful, mobile field artillery
detachment."
After meeting at Budnapoor, General
Wellesley and
Colonel Stevenson decided to split
their force, a seemingly
curious move. Since Wellesley 's division
probably numbered
no more than 7,000 and Stevenson's
was smaller still, they
would defy the time-honored convention of
never splitting
one's force in the face of an enemy superior
in numbers."
A few months later Wellesley explained the
reasoning behind
the separation:
We were desirous to engage the enemy at
the same time, and settled on a plan accordingly for
an
attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the
22nd, he to march by the western, and I by the eastern
road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jalna: and
I have to observe that this separation was
necessary,
-first, because both corps could not pass through the
same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to
be apprehended, that if we left open one of the roads
through the hills, the enemy might have passed to the
southward, while we were going northward, and then
the action would have been delayed, or probably

avoided altogether

.

'°

Wellesley might not have separated his force, however,
had he not possessed full confidence in his intelligence

system which

"reported the enemy to be at Borkerdun," and
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in the reliable,

albeit oftentiimes overly
cautious Colonel

Stevenson, 71

Approaches to Assaye

On the afternoon of 23 September, at Naulniah,
the

general discovered that he had approached the enemy's
pickets. The Mahratta chief was not at Borkardan at all,
but
at Assaye! This news came as a shock. Wellesley had taken
a

chance and divided his force, and now he had encountered

a

vastly superior enemy while at only half strength. Should he
wait for Stevenson in order to face Scindia at full strength
or should he seize the moment and attack the enemy? The

major general rode out to reconnoiter the area and

determined that the Mahrattas seemed certainly as surprised
as he. Evidently they had not expected his approach and had

no idea of his intentions. Now they were hastily breaking

camp and trying to form in an effort to repulse the British.
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wellesley decided quickly to
attack without waiting for
Stevenson. He had an opportunity
to catch Scindia off guard
which might never happen again.
"i therefore,"
he later

commented, "determined to make
the attack."- Wellesley
was sure that surprise would
negate numerical superiority.
How should he attack? Scindia had
chosen his position
well. To his immediate north, on
the Juah River, a tributary
of the Kaitna River, stood the
fortress of Assaye. Of mud
and masonry construction, the fort
could not support
artillery on its ramparts. But Scindia had
ringed it with
artillery, rendering it very dangerous indeed
to any
attacker. He had deployed his regular units
in tandem, with
his other infantry, along the banks of the
Kaitna, south and
west of Assaye. This stream had banks so steep no
carriages

could cross except at its fords. The Mahratta cavalry he
had

stationed far to his right, or west, in
would allow them to envelop

a

a

position that

stalled foe or pursue a

fleeing enemy. The river and the fortress together provided
Scindia with an excellent defensive position. Wellesley's
Indian informants, furthermore, insisted that the only

viable fords over the Kaitna were at Kodully and Taunklee,
both to the immediate front of Scindia 's position and well

within the range of the withering fire of the Mahratta
artillery.

Riding along the Kaitna from west to east, in sight of
the enemy force, Wellesley continued his reconnaissance. As
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a result of this inspection
he

believed he now had found

a

third ford, unguarded by the
Mahrattas, connecting the
village of Peepulgaon on the
south bank to that of Waroor on
the north. Waroor lay to the
left, or west, of where the
Juah joined the Kaitna, and to
the right, or
east, of

Scindia's prepared positions. The
general's hicarrahs,
brahmins he used as guides and spies,
denied any such ford
existed.- Despite their protests, "I
immediately said to
myself," Wellesley later recalled,
"that men could not have
built two villages so close to one another
without
.

some habitual means of communication."^*

.

.

He therefore

decided to move across the ford he thought had
to exist and
hit the enemy in the left flank and rear.- Once
across,

although outnumbered at least eight to one, he could
cause
Scindia to abandon his prepared positions. The Mahratta
leader would have to shift his entire force to his left to
face Wellesley's attack from the east. Surprised, and

crowded between the river and the fort, the Mahrattas might
not even be able to pivot to meet the British, in which case

Wellesley could roll up the enemy flank. The success of the
entire plan, however, rested upon the existence of a ford
his best intelligence denied existed. When asked, much, much

later why he would wager so much on a hope rather than

certainty, the now duke replied:

a

"That is common sense. And

when one is strongly intent on an object, common sense will

usually direct one to the right means.
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"""^

common sense, and his own
reconnaissance in this
instance, brought him to the
right means, for the ford lay
exactly where he had thought
that it should. Enduring an
intense Mahratta artillery barrage,
the redcoats crossed the
Kaitna with their own guns. Most
of Wellesley's cavalry,
however, only 800 in number under
the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Patrick Maxwell, remained
drawn up in line on the
south bank of the Kaitna. Strange as
it may seem, these 800
so intimidated the 30,000 to
60,000 Mahratta cavalry that
they failed to move to support their
infantry. Wellesley had
anticipated that result, but the supposition
was a risky
one. The British horse by their presence
not only denied

Scindia half his force, they also shielded the
first part of
the infantry crossing the river from the Mahrattas."

Wellesley only ordered Maxwell across after the infantry
began to assemble on the north bank, leaving

a

small

contingent of horsemen in place to cover the southern bank.
Once on the north side of the Kaitna, the British

infantry drew up in line, again in the two files Wellesley
favored. The recently-arrived cavalry formed

a

separate

third line, available to shore up any weakness or exploit an
opportunity. When completely formed, the redcoat line

stretched from the banks of the Kaitna, up the narrow tongue
of land formed by the confluence of the Juah and Kaitna, to

the banks of the Juah. Wellesley's army now stood in line,

about

a

mile long, facing west with both flanks protected by
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the rivers. Their looming
presence necessarily forced the
Mahrattas to scramble out of
their secure, prepared
positions along the Kaitna and
reform in a new line facing
east to meet their foes. They
managed to do so quickly
(thanks to their European officers)
if inelegantly,
anchoring their left at Assaye to
the north and their right
on the Kaitna to the south. The
Mahratta artillery commenced
a voluminous, deadly barrage that
began to tear holes in the
thin British lines. Wellesley had fooled
his enemy and
forced him to move out of almost impregnable
defenses into a
hasty, unanticipated formation. But the
British general was
still vastly outnumbered and outgunned. He
now had to either
attack or risk slaughter in place.
He attacked. He pushed his center and left
forward

against the enemy, hoping to force them back and up from
the

Kaitna to the Juah, at which time he believed Assaye would
give up. He did not want his right, however, to attack the
fort.

Its cannon could rip to pieces any assaulting units.

All the British right needed to do was hold its position

until the center and left had pushed Scindia back to the
Juah. Then they could accept the fort's surrender. Wellesley

recognized the potential for disaster should his right come
under fire from Assaye. To prevent that eventuality he

conferred with Lieutenant Colonel William Orrock, the
commander of the unit farthest to the right of the British
line, and proscribed any movement to the north. Wellesley
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^0,
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AssayG
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told colonel orrock
village.

"to keep out of shot from that

The British commander then ordered
the
advance. The disciplined Company
forces moved forward
steadily under what Wellesley called
"a very hot fire from
cannon, the execution of which was
terrible. "^^ He
.

.

.

personally led the 78th Foot who would
attempt to oust the
enemy from their key position along
the Kaitna as they
"advanced rapidly and in good order.
The battle that
followed grew ferocious and deadly. The
Mahratta infantry
held on grimly until the British overran their
artillery.

Only then did they begin to give way. But retreat
they did,
and the Company seemed on the verge of total
victory.
in

the north, however, the pickets and the 74th infantry
had

stumbled to the right into the withering fire of Assaye

,

a

situation Wellesley had from the first dreaded and which he
had tried to prevent."

Colonel Maxwell, of his own

volition, led a cavalry charge that rescued the survivors of
the 74th, although few of Colonel Orrock's pickets

survived. ^=

Despite this tragedy, Wellesley 's tactic of

turning the Mahratta line like

a

gate from the Kaitna up to

the Juah worked. The British took Assaye and sent the

Mahrattas fleeing pellmell. The victory at Assaye was

a

stunning tactical success.
Its cost, however, was horrendous. The Indians endured

some 1200 killed and 4800 wounded, which in terms of their

beginning strength of at least 55,000, amounts to relatively
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s

light casualties. The British,
on the other hand entered
the
battle with about 7,000 troops
and suffered 428 killed and
1,156 wounded." The British commander
bemoaned the
damage.
"i acknowledge," he said,
"that I should not like
to see again such loss as I
sustained on the 23rd September,
even if attended by such a gain."The majority of those
casualties need never have occurred,
and would not have if
Orrock had obeyed orders. They were
suffered by his pickets
and the 74th who followed."

Assaye was notable for its risk and its
daring and
offensive spirit. Major General Wellesley knew
the quality
of his own troops and he knew his enemy.
Convinced that the
Mahrattas would shrink from the disciplined and orderly
attack of His Majesty's and John Company's regiments,

Wellesley pushed on against the vastly stronger Scindia.
The relentless advance of the redcoats in the face of
brutal

artillery fire must have unnerved the Mahrattas. Wellesley'
tactical plan was chancy but sound, considering his enemy
and the alternatives available to the redcoats. Had he

turned away from Scindia, the Mahrattas would surely have

pursued him. Nor could he have afforded to wait for
Stevenson. And even had Stevenson arrived, he could not have

helped much, crowded as he would have been into the

abbreviated battlefield at Assaye. Finally, using his
superior discipline and quite unorthodox tactics, Wellesley

maneuvered his force from a vulnerable position to one of

.

far greater advantage. By
so doing, he negated the
advantage
Scindia had previously enjoyed.
Indeed, «hen asked later
What was the best fighting
he ever did, the Duke replied,
"Assaye

Journeyman General

Arthur Wesley arrived in India as

a

twenty-eight year

old colonel with little military
experience and no military
education. When Arthur Wellesley left for
England in 1805,
he was a major general and a Knight
of the Bath. His series
of successful campaigns had earned him
his promotion. He had

demonstrated talent, dedication and intelligence.
Contrary
to the perceived image, he was not a strictly
defensive

general. His mind ran decidedly in favor of the offense,
even in the face of vastly superior numbers. In India he
had

displayed

a

talent for maneuver and an expert's eye for the

battlefield. He had seemed to develop

a

sense for how each

engagement would unfold.
How much had he learned in India that could serve him
well in the future? He would not again attack at night an

unreconnoitered position. Constant battle had honed his
skills as a tactician, and he had learned to maneuver

relatively large numbers of men in the field. He had learned
how to feed and supply an army, in the process acquiring
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a

well-deserved suspicion of
commissaries.-

He had learned

to oversee, personally,
arrangements for provisioning
armies. In India he had first
used local dealers as both the
sellers and the guardians of their
goods, a system that had
transferred the responsibility for
the security and

transport of the goods from the army
to the merchant. In
India Wellesley had witnessed the
animosity that arose from
civilians who saw their property
appropriated without
recompense. He had instituted a payment
system that would
become standard procedure in Iberia.In India Wellesley
had come to recognize the importance of
adequate transport.
While he was never able to secure it there
to his

satisfaction, he planned for it before each campaign,
not
during it.«^ As in India, Wellesley would fight in
Iberia
over some cart tracks that could barely accommodate

pedestrians. His prior experience with the difficulties of

transport over inhospitable terrain would prove invaluable.
India had taught him much.
It had not taught him, however, the difficult art of

siegecraft or the proper use of artillery. In the

subcontinent the British never had to undertake the grinding
sieges that destroyed cities, people and morale, as they did
in Europe. Wellesley had engaged in a number of siege

operations: Seringapatam (1799); Ahmednuggur (1803); and

Gawilghur (1803). But they were against Indian forts of such
poor quality in their construction that they often could not
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iBOunt cannon in their
defense,

and with walls so low that

attackers could scale them easily.-

The British could

often end a siege victoriously
shortly after they began it.
Wellesley never faced the type of
fortress he would
encounter in Spain, such as the
Vaubanesque citadel of
Badajoz, with its high walls, trench,
glacis, and outer
works, defended by formidable
artillery batteries. India
tested his skills on the battlefield,
but in no way prepared
him for the complexities and dangers
of European-style siege
warfare. Indeed, India may have given him
the disastrouslywrong impression that all siege warfare would
resemble what
he had experienced.
He had used artillery in India, but only
incidentally.

From the mid-eighteenth century through Viet Nam,
artillery
has been the single greatest killer on the battlefield.
Yet

Wellesley in India seemed to know only that he needed
cannons, which he may even have considered an inconvenience,

because they were so heavy and difficult to transport.'^
Ironically, he would work tirelessly to transport his

artillery and then seem, many times, to employ his guns only
as an afterthought. Perhaps the superb qualities displayed

by British or British-trained infantry against the

footsoldiers of Indian princes caused him to downgrade the

importance of the big guns. Perhaps the fact that the

artillery moved so slowly that it could not keep up with his
infantry in rapid marches and maneuvers in India led him to
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neglect it.^= Whatever the case,
he would have to learn in
Spain What he had failed to
learn in India, how to integrate
artillery with infantry and cavalry
to form a coherent and
complete fighting army.
Thus when Major General Sir Arthur
Wellesley, K.B.,
left India in 1805, he left with
a well-deserved reputation
as a man who could supply,
administer, and lead to victory
in the field large numbers of
British and John Company
soldiers. But because he had not learned
much about
siegecraft or the proper uses of artillery,
he left India
as, at best, a journeyman general.
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CHAPTER

3

MASTER OF THE DEFENSE

From India to Th^T-ia

Sir Arthur's Indian exploits ended
in March, 1805. He
returned to England in September to
find that both he and
his successes were all but unknown
outside military and
political circles. With Napoleon running
roughshod all over
Europe and threatening Britain with invasion,
the ancillary

theater of India held little interest for the
public at
large. Immediately after his arrival, Wellesley
directed his

energies primarily toward the exoneration of his older
brother, Richard, whom the East India Company had sacked.

Richard's efforts to expand British presence and hegemony in
India, a program avidly supported by Arthur, was ahead of
its time in the imperial scheme of things. Richard's tenure
as governor general witnessed protracted fighting throughout

the country. The East India Company, weary of the human,

financial and diplomatic expense, replaced Mornington with
Lord Cornwallis, the paragon of dependable stability.

After Richard returned to England, Sir Arthur set about
his own business. The major general had political

relationships of his own to nurture. Pitt had held Wellesley
in very high regard and continued to do so. They rode
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together one day from Wimbledon
to London, "very slowly," as
Arthur wrote to his brother:
opportunity of discussing with
.^T^explaining f^ll
and
all the points of our late system in
^^'^^ objections had been made which were
Uke?vVn° ^^^5
impression upon him.
Upon aU of
l^^tJv.
these his mind appeared satisfied.^
hiT.
him

.

.

Wellesley was anxious to enter the
on-going war on the
continent against Napoleon, and, to that
end, he secured an
assignment as brigade commander in an
expedition intended
for the Elbe in December, 1805. Fortunately,
the British
government canceled that mission before the troops
could be
committed, because of Bonaparte's seeming
invincibility,
especially after the French victories over the
Austrians
earlier in October, and the more recent annihilation of
the

Russians at Austerlitz.^

The government then managed to

find for Sir Arthur only an insignificant brigade command
in

Hastings. Command of a mere brigade in garrison, after
India, would certainly have offended most military officers,
a

group not renowned for their humility, but not Wellesley:

am nim muk wallah, as we say in the East,
that is, I have eaten of the King's salt, and,
therefore, I conceive it to be my duty to serve with
unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness, when and wherever
the King or his Government may think proper to employ
me ^
I

.

The government found him more proper employment in very

short order. From July until September 1807, Sir Arthur

played an important role in the British expedition to
Denmark."

Although largely a naval operation, the
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expedition included

a^y

units sent to capture the
Danish

capital city fro™ the landward
side as the ships blockaded
the port, wellesley led a
force that screened the British
attack on the city and prevented
the Danish regulars from
interfering with it. The Danish
experience marked the future
field marshal's first encounter
with a European force since
the debacle in Flanders twelve
years earlier. He performed
well, deflecting several Danish
attempts to pierce his
screen and thereby helped to facilitate
the rapid
capitulation of the city.

Wellesley returned to England in the
autumn of 1807 a
much-lauded man. The next April, the government
promoted him
to lieutenant general, the youngest
officer of
that rank in

the army.^

By this time, Napoleon had created a
vassal

state in Spain by deposing the popular Spanish
king,
Ferdinand, and installing his brother, Joseph
Bonaparte, on

that throne. Napoleon's arbitrary action had so
angered the

people of Spain that they had risen up in revolt.-^

Both

Spain and Portugal, the most likely future target of

Bonapartist expansion, pleaded to London for help in the
summer of 1808. The British government responded favorably.
It raised a 9,000 man expeditionary force destined for

Portugal and designated Lieutenant General Sir Arthur

Wellesley as commander.''
Sir Arthur had been long anxious to face the near-

legendary Bonaparte. As his departure neared he remarked:
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"My die is cast.-- He seemed
on the verge of realizing his
destiny:
*^^^^ "'^^ overwhelm me, but I don't
think
thPv
"'^"^^^^^^
First, because I am not
afraid if ?h
^^^^^^y^°dy else seems to be; and
secondlv h^^r'
^^^^^^ °^
™iL'is\^?:e''i"^?L^ -rL^a

wm

.

:er:^rT?h-n
-'i: :-.TsT,

^-"^"^^

'^^-^

I

-f-

--re^the

-tl^s

be.un

That short passage supplies a
beautifully succinct
insight into Wellesley's military
thinking in 1808. First,
he remained convinced that his troops,
steady through
discipline, could overcome French superiority
of numbers
(which the French would maintain in the
peninsula until
1813). Second, he recognized the flaws inherent
in French

infantry tactics. The French usually attacked
in

formation or

a

a

column

combination of line and column that the

French termed the ordre mixte

.

Sir Arthur rightly believed

that the highly disciplined two-deep line, bringing far
more

muskets to bear on the attackers than could be leveled at
the redcoats at one time, could defeat the Imperial armies

despite their brilliant record against the other continental
forces. Finally, the future field marshal displayed supreme

confidence in his own abilities. Perhaps no quality is more

valuable in a general because it is both highly visible and
contagious. It can turn possible fear and apprehension in

subordinates into an unquenchable thirst for victory.
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Iberia
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The Peninsu lar War
,

1808-1R1

n

Sir Arthur's force arrived
in Portugal, at Oporto, on
1
August 1808. Wellesley assembled
his men and moved south to
engage the French, who were
trying to capture Lisbon. He
defeated the French at Vimiero,
only to find himself
superseded by two senior generals,
Sir Harry Burrard and Sir
Hew Dalrymple. The most charitable
description one can give
these two officers is to call them
cautious to a fault. They
ordered him to sign the Convention of
Cintra, the terms of
which allowed General Andoche Junot,
the French commander,
to quit the battlefield and retreat
to Spain unmolested. The
convention and its consequences disgusted
Wellesley and
raised a furor in Britain. William Wordsworth
wrote

disparagingly that the British generals had
.triumph into defeat."^

".

.

.changed,

But a court of inquiry in England

exonerated the lieutenant general completely, and he
returned to Portugal as the unquestioned commander in chief
in the spring of 1809.

Wellesley immediately organized his forces for an
incursion into Spain. The war was unpopular on the homefront and the government was eager for a quick victory.
Named, on

6

July 1809 Marshal-General of the Portuguese

army, he assigned one of his most dependable lieutenants.

General Sir William Carr Beresford, to train and lead that
force. Sir Arthur, in the meanwhile, ventured into Spain
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along the Tagus River valley
and won a masterful defensive
victory over the imperial army
at Talavera, with (or rather,
in spite of) his Spanish
allies. The smashing victory at
Talavera boosted the morale of the
allied armies hugely and
shored up support in Britain for
the war effort. It also
prompted the government to raise
Wellesley to the peerage as
Viscount Wellington and Baron Duoro.

Lord Wellington now found it increasingly
difficult to
work with the often imperious and always
obstinate Spanish.
"I find Cuesta [General Gregorio
Garcia de la
Cuesta, the

commander of the Spanish at Talavera] more and
more
impractical everyday," wrote the lieutenant general.
"It is

impossible to do business with him and very uncertain
that
any operation will succeed in which he has any concern. "^°
Furthermore, following Talavera the Anglo-Portuguese army
\

lay in mortal danger of being isolated from their lines of

communication to Lisbon by interposing French armies.
Communication and cooperation between the Spanish and the

Anglo-Portuguese deteriorated to a point where the British
commander-in-chief, exasperated, retreated to Portugal
leaving the Spanish to their own devices. According to one

historian of the Peninsular War, General Sir William Napier:

The departure of the English army from Spain
was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsular War. The
policy of combining operations, and of striking
directly at the great masses of the French had been
acted upon and failed; the long cherished delusion
relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency
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was thus dissipated
<^i-r^™ -i-k-!
^°
of the struggle Welie;i;v*f^?
""S"*^"^
warred
^^^^
indeed for Spain
and in Snain L!!
have
fisheS fn^aAy trouble/°"^""^'S" "^^^ ^P^^"'
^^"^
^^^"^^^
troubled
waters ^ win^never trv
^^^^
speaKing of th-HLSgn^^S'L^^^pf

^

i

Lrrord!^^"

The British retreat into
Portugal, did, however, bring
some advantages with it.
Wellington had always considered
Portugal defensible, even against
the apparently formidable
French superiority of numbers.To ensure the safety of
that haven, in September 1809
the future duke had ordered
the preparation of a series of
defenses near Lisbon, into
which he could retire his army should
the French threaten to
overwhelm the allies. Kept completely
hidden from the
imperial armies, the defenses, known as
the Lines of Torres
Vedras, were completed in time for the
British
to fall

behind them in the winter of 1810, just as

a

French force

threatened to destroy them. The Napoleonic army
instead had
to quit Portugal, frustrated that the British
were
safe

behind the Lines.
Following the stand at Torres Vedras the Anglo-

Portuguese army prepared to take the offensive. Wellington
had received significant reinforcements and General

Beresford had transformed the Portuguese into

a

cohesive and

disciplined force. The offensive, however, turned into

a

siege campaign. The two eastern Moors' between Portugal and
Spain were guarded by very strong fortresses. In the south

they were Elvas on the Portuguese side and Badajoz on the

Spanish side, and in the north, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo,
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respectively. In 1811 the French
controlled Al.eida, ciudad
Rodrigo and Badajoz. To campaign
effectively in western
Spain, Wellington had to make
sure the doors remained open
by taking control of the
citadels which Lady Longford
so

appropriately calls ^the keys to Spain'.
He depended upon
support from Lisbon, to which
British ships brought the
supplies for the expeditionary force.
An enemy in control of
those forts could sally forth to
cut the British supply
lines. During 1812, at great human
cost, Britain won control
of all three. Following the capture
of Badajoz, the last to
fall, Wellington made for Salamanca

and fought a stupendous

battle, completely routing the French force
of Marshal

Auguste Marmont. The British followed that victory
with

a

triumphant entry into Madrid.
Then the future duke committed

a

strategic error. He

tried to capture the heavily-fortified citadel at Burgos.
The French armies, scattered after Salamanca, quickly

reassembled. They not only chased the British away from
Burgos, but sent them reeling all the way back to the safety
of Portugal. That setback proved only temporary. In 1813

Wellington pushed the French all the way to the Pyrenees,

winning a stunning victory at Vitoria on 21 June, for which
he was created field marshal, the first person in the

history of the British army to receive a baton as
that high rank."

a

symbol

He continued his advance, bringing the

Peninsular War to an end with

a
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victory at the battle of

Toulouse on 10 April 1814.
Ironically, Toulouse was
contested four days after
Napoleon's abdication

(which

brought little consolation to
the 1600 Anglo-French
casualties of that battle). Field
Marshal the Marquess
Wellington became the Duke of
Wellington on 3 May 1814.The Peninsular War thus consisted
of three distinct
phases. The first was the defense
of Portugal, necessitated
by overwhelming French superiority
of numbers (in part owing
to a lack of reinforcements from
Britain), lack of money for
local procurement and purchase, and,
not least, a bare
trickle of resupply from Britain. The
second phase involved
siegecraft. Conduct of campaigns far from
the home base of
Lisbon required the security of uninterrupted
lines of

communication and supply,

m

order to provide that security,

Wellington had to control the frontier fortresses.
The third
phase witnessed the two-year offensive that swept the
French
back across the Pyrenees.

The Defense; The Better Part of Valor

Wellesley's task in the spring of 1809 was not to
defeat the imperial French armies in Iberia but, rather, to

avoid being beaten. Simply put, he must hold off the French.
The Iberian portion of Napoleon's Grande Armee was indeed

formidable, exceeding 300,000 troops.'^
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The British forces

in the peninsula numbered
barely 20,000.- Even the

combined Anglo-Portuguese
army had less than one sixth
of
the men of imperial French
army. The French enjoyed the
strategic and logistic luxury
of interior lines even though
guerrillas threatened those lines
more and more as the
campaign progressed. Conversely,
sir Arthur's supply lines
stretched back to England from
whence little came until
1811. Britain did not, at first,
wholly commit itself to the
war in Spain, and that lack of

commitment resulted in

generally sporadic and always
insufficient financing and
resupply. Reinforcements barely
trickled in before 1812.^^
The allied army, furthermore, was
allied in name only. The
well-trained British regulars formed the core
of the army.

But the Portuguese troops required many
months of drill with
a

contingent of British cadre to become

a

sturdy and

dependable force. To their credit, at Talavera they

performed very well, sir Arthur having positioned them so
they needed to maneuver very little."

One could

certainly, after Talavera, if not before, describe

Wellesley's force as an Anglo-Portuguese one. The same did
not apply with the Spanish. They were grateful for British

assistance but believed that the redcoats should bow
themselves to the authority of the Spanish Junta. The
British served, after all, in Spain.
Into this situation came

a

general who had hitherto won

his victories by attacking his foes in battle. Before he
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left for Portugal the
future field marshal had studied
not
only the tactical doctrines
of the British army, but also
those of Prussia, Russia
and France. Additionally, sir
Arthur had followed closely
the progress of Napoleon and
understood the Frenchman's tactics.
Although Wellesley's

confidence in himself and his army
remained unshaken, he
became, by force of circumstance,
more cautious, "i could
lick these fellows any day," he
remarked
in 1810,

"but it

would cost me 10,000 men, and as this
is the last army
England has, we must take care of it."Circumstances
required the young lieutenant general to
become a defensive
commander. As India had schooled him in
practicing the
intricacies of the offense, the first years in
Iberia would
serve him similarly for the defense. He seems
to have

possessed an uncanny knack for this type of combat.
In India
he had worked hard to learn to judge the lay of the
ground

and how to use terrain to enhance his tactical employments.

The knowledge he had acquired there he turned to its

greatest advantage against the daunting Napoleonic armies.
As

a

result of his studies and his contact with the

French he formulated

a

threefold strategy for defeating

them. First, he would protect his infantry for so long as

possible. Without any favorable terrain to shelter them, he

could order them, at least, to lie flat on the ground. But
the future duke usually chose where to give battle, and he

usually chose

a

position in which the topography favored
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hi., atop hills and
ridges. There he could position
his men
on the reverse slope
of hills, out of the line
of fire.If he found himself
caught on the forward slope of
a rise,
he would keep the infantry
out of musket range until the
skirmishers and artillery, placed
well forward, stood in
peril of being overwhelmed.
Stationing his infantry thus
'

them largely invisible to the
opposing general,
preventing the enemy from determining
troop dispositions, it
also minimized the toll French
artillery - which they
habitually used to bombard an enemy
preparatory to their
assaults - would take on the infantry.
Not knowing
Wellesley's troop dispositions or having any
iKade

idea of the

effect of his artillery on the British,

a

French commander

could not focus his attack or even know the
strength or type
of the British forces he faced. As a
result, time and again
the French would attack, always uphill, a force
of unknown
strength and disposition.
To ensure their ignorance, he developed a second

tactic. He would deploy light infantry skirmishers

actual formation

-

-

in no

to disrupt the first enemy attackers to

appear. These skirmishers, often as much as a third of his

infantry, would engage the French skirmishers, or

tirailleurs

.

The French had used them throughout Europe with

great success, as Wellesley knew because of his studies and
observations. If his own skirmishers could deflect the
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French ones, the tirailleurs
would not be able to probe his
lines and detect his strengths
and weaknesses, particularly
the position Of the .najority
of his infantry, lying in wait
for a major assault.
Finally, he intended always to
protect his flanks. If
he coy Id find natural
geographical features to do so, fine.
If not, he would detail
enough troops (usually cavalry) to
carry out the job. Wellesley hoped
to prevent enfilade fire
and flanking attacks by anchoring
his wings in villages, or
on river banks, or on ground
presenting other topographical
obstacles to the enemy. This practice he
hoped would reduce
or even negate the advantages of superior
numbers, which the
French usually possessed. An enemy commander
would lose the
option of simultaneous attacks at multiple points.
Patient
and careful selection of the place of
encounter by a

commander can certainly work to overcome his numerical
inferiority, as Sir Arthur hoped to show. He would now test
his theories in the field and find them fully justified. His

defensive brilliance bested the more numerous French at
Talavera, Bussaco and at the Lines of Torres Vedras.

Talavera

The British field force ventured into Spain in the

spring of 1809, soon after Wellesley 's return from the

Cintra inquiries. Early July
found Sir Arthur still trying
to operate in conjunction
with the Spanish, making this
sortie an effort at combined
operation. The British

commander in chief marched the
Anglo-Portuguese force of
20,000 along the Tagus River valley
to join
the 27,000

infantry and 6,000 cavalry of General
Gregorio Garcia de la
Cuesta near Talavera." The lieutenant
general believed
that the combined allied army of
56,000 could easily hold or
even defeat the assembled 34,000
troops of French Marshal
Claude Victor. The success of the operation
depended on
keeping a second French force, that of
General Francois
Sebastiani, from uniting with Victor. Wellesley
and Cuesta
agreed to dispatch General Francisco Venegas'
Army of La

Mancha to keep Sebastiani occupied."
Venegas failed to contain Sebastiani 's force. It
joined
Victor's on 26 July bringing the French strength to around
50,000, roughly equal that of the allies.

The allied

force was, however, markedly weaker than the French because
of the untested Portuguese and the proven unreliability of

the 34,000 Spanish. Wellesley, by winning a battle of wills

against Cuesta, selected the site of the battle;
Talavera.^^

Anchoring his right flank on the Tagus, in the

village proper, the lieutenant general arrayed his lines
northward along

a

rise just west of a brook, the Portina

Stream. Sir Arthur secured his left on the high ground of

the Cerro de Medellin. This position shows superbly
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Wellesley^s cogent terrain
analysis. The Tagus prevented an
enemy flanking attack from
the south, thus making the
right
secure. The stream, combined
with the upslope, provided a
double Obstacle to attackers
against the lines arrayed
between the village and the
cerro. Finally, Wellesley
entrusted his left flank, on the
high ground
of the cerro,

to one of his most able division
commanders. General sir
Rowland Hill. The left was additionally
buttressed by
cavalry. By common consent, Cuesta
placed his Spanish
divisions along the brook, closest to
the town, where the
terrain was steepest and most easily
defensible, masked as
it was by olive groves.
The two opposing forces engaged in minor
combats at

Alcabon and Salinas prior to the battle proper.
During the
action at Salinas, 10,000 Spanish fled the field
at the

first sound of musket fire, some of it their own. Even

though Cuesta was able to recover some of the fleeing
soldiers the net loss came to over 6,000 troops.

^'^

This

episode, indicative of the unreliability of Spanish troops
in combined operations, served irretrievably to undermine

Wellesley's confidence in his ally.
The actual fighting in the prepared positions at

Talavera began on 27 July, continued throughout that night,
and ended in the late afternoon of the 28th. For practical

purposes the battle of Talavera pitted 40,000 French against
20,000 British. After one probing attack early in the
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afternoon of the 27th,

the French largely ignored
the

geographically-unassailable position occupied
by the
Spanish. All the French effort,
thereafter, focused on the
British lines. They first
attacked Hill's division on the
cerro. His veterans of Vimiero
from the protection of their
position repulsed Victor's assault
with deadly volley fire.
Victor launched a second attack
at the cerro, this time
under cover of darkness, augmenting
it with a flanking
attack from the north. Confident
there would be no night
action, the Anglo-Portuguese forces
were literally caught
napping. But Hill's division repulsed
the French yet again
using disciplined volley fire while
Wellesley's well-placed
cavalry interdicted the French flanking
attack. Victor now
attempted a massive frontal assault on the morning
of the

28th. Attacking into the teeth of the redcoat
defense on the

cerro, the French columns again faced withering,
disciplined

volley fire. Until now General John Sherbrooke's

brigade,

deployed immediately south of the cerro, had remained

virtually untouched. Sherbrooke pivoted his force to the
left and raked the French columns with a terrible flanking
fire. That broke the French attack, and they fled the

battlefield. Outnumbered two to one, Wellesley's superior

position and disciplined troops had suffered 5,000

casualties to the 7,000 of the French. "The battle of
Talavera was the hardest fought of modern times," wrote the
British commander. "The fire at Assaye was heavier while it
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lasted; but the battle of
Talavera lasted for two days
and a
night.

Wellesley became Viscount
Wellington on
1809, in recognition of the
victory at

4

September

Talavera. He could

not long savor that honor,
however. He had to retreat into
Portugal because Marshal Soult's
50,000-man force approached
rapidly from the northwest in
an attempt to cut off
Wellington's escape route. During
this retreat the British
general secretly ordered the
construction of a series of
defensive belts in Portugal near Lisbon.These defenses,
which would become known as the Lines
of Torres Vedras,
would prove the salvation of the British
effort in Iberia
one year later. As the Anglo-Portuguese
force, forever

separated from the Spanish army, retreated
into the relative
safety of Portugal, the French set about the
detailed

destruction of the Spanish. They completed the task
by 1810.

Bussaco and Torres Vedras

Wellesley kept his force in Portugal for over

a year,

husbanding assets and supplies. Although logistics improved
and reinforcements trickled in, neither came in sufficient

quantity to convince the lieutenant general to venture
across the frontier during that year. Napoleon, meanwhile,
had determined to drive out all British forces, the ^hideous

leopard' as he called the.,
fro. Iberia. The e.peror created
the Army of Portugal,
numbering 138,000 men, and installed
Marshal Andre Massena as
commander.- Napoleon ordered his
marshal to "
.put himself in a position to
hold in
check 25,000 English commanded
by General Wellington, and to
follow the army to attack and
destroy it."- Massena began
his preparations to achieve
that goal in April,
.

.

1810.

Wellington, meanwhile, continued to
strengthen his
defenses at Torres Vedras, named for
the eponymous town that
served as its all-important central
foundation. Planning had
begun after a Portuguese officer, Major
Jose Maria das Neves
Costa, conducted a reconnaissance of the
area north of

Lisbon in late 1808 and forwarded his annotated
maps and

recommendations to the British commander in chief.

sir

Arthur then, together with Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Fletcher, the chief British engineer in the peninsula,

conducted his own reconnaissance in September of 1809."
They determined the best locations for

a

myriad of defensive

installations they believed necessary to stop the French

before they could reach Lisbon. The rough, unforgiving

mountains and the few roads virtually guaranteed the
specific avenues of approach any attacker would have to use.

Wellington dispatched

a

memorandum to Colonel Fletcher on 20

October 1809. In it he detailed how the engineer should
establish two or three belts of works that would render the

Anglo-Portuguese position impregnable to French assault. He
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directed Fletcher to construct
da.s, redoubts, signal posts,
barriers, entrenchments and
other defensive works.-.
Why did Wellington undertake
such a massive project? He
outlined his reasons in a
Memorandum on the Defence of
Portugal, solicited from him
by the British Secretary of
State, Lord Castlereagh. The
Memorandum shows Wellington's
clear understanding of the
situation he presently faced and
his almost clairvoyant view of
the future war in
the

peninsula.
I have always been of the
opinion that
Portugal might be defended, whatever
might be the
result of the contest in Spain, and
that
meantime measures adopted for the defence in the
of Portugal
would be highly useful to the Spaniards
in
contest with the French. My notion was that their
the
Portuguese military establishment ought to be
revived
and that in addition to those troops His
Majesty ought
to employ about 20,000 British troops,
including about
4,000 cavalry. My opinion was that, even if Spain
should have been conquered, the French would not
be
able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than
100,000 men. As long as the contest may continue in
Spain, this force [the 20,000 British troops], if
it
could be placed in a state of activity, would be highly
useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually decide
the contest.

Other portions of the

Memorandum argued that the

French might even need more than 100,000 troops to dislodge
the defenders, but that the probability of their being able
to march a force of that size through the harsh, barren

Portuguese interior was very unlikely. The Memorandum also

predicted the campaign in Iberia would drag on for quite
while. Given that probability, defending the Lisbon

peninsula would bring the French up short,
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a

legitimate"

a

tactic in a protracted
campaign. Wellington's views
ran
contrary to the conventional
military wisdom of the day. For
instance, six months before
Sir Arthur's communication to
Castlereagh, the late Sir John
Moore, the much-respected
defender of Corunna, had argued,
"generally that the
frontier of Portugal is not
defensible against a superior
force." Sir John said: "it is
an open frontier, all equally
rugged, but all equally to be
penetrated. If the French

succeed in Spain it will be vain to
attempt to resist them
in Portugal."- Wellington did
not dismiss Moore's
judgment lightly. "The greatest disadvantage
under which I
labour [preparing the Lines]," sir Arthur
observed, "is that
Sir John Moore gave an opinion that the
country could
not be

defended by an army under his command. "^^

But Wellington

stuck to his own views because Moore had never
been to

Portugal to assess the situation with his own eyes. In
the
final analysis. Lord Castlereagh accepted Sir Arthur's

opinions. Massena's Army of Portugal would, to its

misfortune, test the results

a

year later.

The fixed fortifications of the Lines, manned by

regulars, comprised only half of the defensive scheme. In
addition, Wellington enlisted the aid of a huge force of

irregulars to harass and molest the French in any efforts

they made to advance and live off the land. He found this

relatively easy to accomplish because he had continued his
policies, first begun in India, of remunerating civilians
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for goods and services
provided to his soldiers. Lord

Wellington, furthermore, punished
pillagers ruthlessly,
further endearing the British
commander to the Portuguese.
They especially appreciated
Wellington's methods since they
had experienced the French
withdrawals of 1808 and
1809,

marked by cruelty, pillage and rape.
Thus, when the British
commander in chief called for irregulars
and special

sacrifices by all of the people, he met
almost universal
cooperation, even when he told the Portuguese
to remove all
foodstuffs and materiel behind the Lines or,

if not able to

do so, destroy them. The Portuguese would
thus deny the

French invaders the means to subsist, while harassing
them

constantly by guerilla operations.
Massena, with 138,000 men, began his invasion of

Portugal in 1810, unaware of the obstacles Wellington had
put in his way. First he besieged and captured the

fortresses guarding the northeastern approach into the
country, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida."

As the French

marshal moved into the interior, Wellington kept his own

Anglo-Portuguese army of 52,000 just out of reach, never
allowing his force to become decisively engaged with the

vastly greater numbers of French. Massena, for his part,
soon experienced the results of Wellington's work with his

Portuguese friends.

"It is impossible to find worse roads

than these," wrote Massena. "All our marches are across a
desert; not a soul to be seen anywhere; everything is
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.

abandoned.-.

The French marshal finally,
however,
Wellington near Bussaco on 25
April 1810.

^found'

Wellington had intended he do so.
The British general
had discovered a defensive
position to
his liking. He had

deployed his 52,000 men and
their 60 guns on a ridge, nine
miles long. From atop it they
had an excellent view of the
battlefield into which geography
would funnel the French.
The steep slope of the ridge
protected the allied front and
flanks. The Mondego River further
guarded the allied right.
The height of the ridge essentially
neutralized Massena's
artillery, which he had struggled to drag
through the narrow
passes of the precipitous mountains of
northern Portugal.
Early nineteenth-century cannon could hurl
their balls only
at low velocity with a resulting arcing
trajectory.
As a

result they could not fire upward very effectively
against
troops deployed as were the allies. Wellington's guns,
by
contrast, could work with deadly effect on an enemy climbing
up the steep sides of the ridge. Massena, furthermore, had

managed to assemble only 65,000 of his army for battle.
These troops, to reach their enemies, would have to attack
up the steep defile without the benefit of artillery

support
The battle of Bussaco followed. The Napoleonic armies

had hitherto enjoyed success throughout Europe by utilizing

column formations in the attack. They did so at Bussaco,

attacking uphill in dense, compact columns. Disciplined
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British infantry volley
fire joined British artillery hurling canister and grape
shot - in tearing to shreds
the
thick formations crawling
up the incline of the ridge.

The French charged repeatedly in their coluinns,
but

could never break the British, who inflicted terrible
damage. General Maximilien Foy, who led a column in
that

assault, vividly described the carnage:

My heroic column, much diminished during the
ascent, reached the summit of the plateau, which was covered
with hostile troops. Those on our left made a flank movement
and smashed us up by their battalion volleys; meanwhile,
those on our front, covered by some rocks, were murdering us
with impunity. The head of my column fell back to its right,
despite my efforts; I could not get them to deploy, disorderset in, and the 17th and 70th raced downhill in headlong
flight.
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Finally, beaten badly, all
the French had to give up
the assault. They had lost
5,000 men to the allies' 1,250.

Wellington had broken the code.
Napoleonic armies, blindly
adhering to their mentor's tactics,
had fallen victim to
commanding position and volley fire.*^
Rebuffed, Massena still vastly
outnumbered his
adversaries. He now redoubled his
efforts to catch them.
Wellington retired to Torres Vedras
and awaited the French
marshal. Massena finally reached the
Lines in October. What
he saw shocked him. He had dismissed
as ludicrous the
initial reports of his scouts.- He should
have paid
closer attention. For he now found, arrayed
before him, 165

fortified sections

-

redoubts

-

equipped with 628 guns and

manned by 45,000 Anglo-Portuguese regulars. The
redoubts
varied in size and strength with garrisons ranging
from 50
to 2,000 soldiers. The defenses were integrated
into the

adjoining terrain to form three belts arranged

concentrically on the peninsula. They communicated by signal
telegraph, installed by the Royal Navy. The navy had also

positioned gunboats in the Tagus.*"

Massena could find

no way through or around the Lines. His invading Army of

Portugal was impotent, now caught between the Lines to his
front and

a

very inhospitable group of irregulars to his

rear. With insignificant exceptions, the irregulars had

swept the land of all usable food and forage and had severed
the French lines of communication between Spain and
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Portugal. Massena had no
choice but to quit Portugal,
unable
to drive the ^hideous leopard'
into the sea. By this ti™e

Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese
force had bled Massena's army
Of 73,000 men."*

Artillery

Wellington's artillery contributed
increasingly to this
bleeding. He used it ever more frequently
to ever better
purpose between 1808 and 1811.
part he did so because he
acquired more and more guns and ammunition as
the campaign
progressed, and because he had increased and improved

m

overland transport. In addition, the lieutenant
general grew
increasingly more familiar with artillery employment and
capabilities.
He hid his infantry from the French cannoneers, knowing

full well the destructive capability of French artillery. By

contrast his guns, ever growing in numbers, did more and
more damage to the French infantry. At Talavera the British
employed

30

guns; at Bussaco, 60; and in the defense of the

lines of Torres Vedras

,

almost 700.*^

The future field-

marshal obviously came to recognize that artillery could
increase significantly the killing power of his army, an

especially valuable asset in the face of the vastly larger
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French forces. The French
lost 5,000 dead at the battle
of
Bussaco, the majority victims
of British artillery.-

Master of the Defpnc;^

Wellington conducted

a

handful of major defensive

actions and a host of minor engagements
in the Peninsula. At
each of these engagements the French
had initiated the
attack, obviously in the belief that
they would win. That
faith cost them heavily. They lost the
battles and large
numbers of men as well. After the relatively
high ten
percent casualties at Talavera, Wellington's
men, when
fighting defensively, generally experienced a
casualty rate
of under four percent as compared to the
eight percent
and

higher the French suffered during the same period.^"

The

future duke's method of fighting the Napoleonic armies
in
Iberia would become so effective that the French generals

would grow genuinely afraid to engage him."

Somehow, he

did not seem to fight fairly. How else explain his success

against France's best? Lieutenant Colonel Jean Jacques
Pelet, aide-de-camp to Marshal Massena during the operations
in Portugal, penned a seven-point condemnation of

Wellington's tactical deployments at Bussaco."'

Pelet

failed to mention, however, the overwhelming victory this

British general won with his faulty tactics. General Foy
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went even further. He condemned
Wellington's perceived
preference for the defense as a
dishonorable means of
conducting war.^°
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CHAPTER

4

SIEGECRAFT IN THE PENINSULA

Sieqecraft; WpI

in the^™aSrof"°"^
Its anna?""

1 i

ngton ^ k Anhin es

that the record of the Peninsular army
''^^ """^^ brilliant page in^
Sir Charles Oman^

The conduct of sieges is as old as combat
itself. With

the advent of effective artillery, sieges
usually progressed
in a standard fashion. The besiegers first
surrounded the

fort, fortress or city, cutting it off from
outside help.

Next they bombarded the curtain walls until the artillery

had breached them. Finally, the besiegers assaulted their

enemy through the breaches. The conduct of the siege

campaign in nineteenth-century Iberia was very rudimentary,
however, even by contemporary standards. Part of the reason
for this primitiveness owed to the extreme difficulties both

sides encountered attempting to transport the artillery

necessary to breach the walls of the fortresses. Siege
artillery, conventionally referred to as the siege train,

weighed much more than field artillery because the guns were
much larger in caliber and of more rugged construction,
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hence heavier than the field
pieces. Only these behemoths
could fire the large shot
fired at the high velocity
necessary to batter the walls
of the fortresses. The
smallest practical component of
a siege train
was the

eighteen-pounder (18-pdr).^

Twenty-four pounders (24-pdrs

were probably the best combination
of power to weight.
Thirty-two pounders (3 2-pdrs) were the
most powerful but,
course, much heavier than those of
smaller caliber.
Moreover, the ox-cart ruts that passed
for roads in Spain,
usually in deplorable condition, often
made overland
transport, when possible, a nightmare. Under
those

circumstances, the greater portability of the 18and 24pdrs far overshadowed their relatively lower
firepower.
Ammunition, of course was also very heavy and in
chronical
short supply. Finally, the British artillery corps
often

lacked sufficient numbers of trained artillerists.
The successful conduct of a siege required not only

heavy guns with trained artillerymen but also, and
indispensably, a body of trained engineers. The engineer

corps existed in little more than name in the British army
Its officers, good, bad and indifferent, gained promotion

only by seniority. Wellington's chief engineer in the
peninsula, forty-one year old Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Fletcher, possessed experience and military sagacity far

beyond his rank.^

At the least he should probably have

been a brigadier. The rank and file of the engineer corps,
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the sappers and miners,
formed only a small cadre of the
Royal Military Artificers.
Unfortunately for Wellington, not
until 1812 did the first of
these "trained" sappers and
miners arrive in the peninsular
theater. Upon observing them
there, the British commander
averred that they "had never
seen a sap, battery, or trench
constructed."^ The poor
state of the engineer corps and the
siege artillery owed
mainly to the miserliness of the
British government, which
had attempted to economize. Britain was
an island nation
rich in naval tradition and accustomed
to glorious victories
at sea.

Sailors such as Drake and Nelson were her
heroes.

Land warfare and siegecraft played no part
in the great
traditions. Most Englishmen in 1812 probably
could name only
one outstanding general from their history; the
Duke of

Marlborough. The famed exploits of that revered peer had

taken place 100 years ago, well beyond the memory of people
living in the 1800 's. Moreover, Britain had been at war with
France almost continuously since the French Revolution.

During that 20 years, not once had a British force faced the
prospect of

a

siege against a properly constructed and

prepared fortress.^

It is, therefore, not surprising that

siegecraft was foreign to the British army in the peninsula.
General Wellington's experiences in the art were, at
best, superficial. The native forts of India were old in

design and poor in construction. The flimsy walls of the
fort at Assaye could not even support the weight of
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Scindia's guns. Often the mere
presence of the redcoats
catapulted the Indians into flight,
obviating the necessity
for any sort of siege. India
had provided Wellington with
little preparation for the
scientifically-designed citadels
of Iberia.
"The truth is," complained the
British commander in
chief, "that, equipped as we are,
the British army are not
capable of carrying on a regular siege. "^
Equipped or not,
the British would find their activities
in the Peninsular
War confined to the successful defense
of Portugal unless
they could control the fortresses of Ciudad
Rodrigo and

Badajoz. Those two citadels, held by French
regulars,

guarded the best routes between Spain and Portugal.
He knew
he had to take those roads to supply and move his
army.
In

the interior of Spain, Wellington would also find
himself

involved in the siege of another citadel, Burgos, as part of
a larger

offensive campaign against the French. Wellington

took two out of the three in 1812, but at heavy cost. He
felt deeply the human consequences, measured in high

casualty rates, of his mistakes and, therefore, rarely

committed the same error twice.

His steadily-decreasing

casualties during the defense of Portugal attest to that
feature of his generalship. Yet the future field marshal's

record in siege operations does not match his record in open
battle, just the reverse. He took higher casualties at

Badajoz than in the earlier effort at Ciudad Rodrigo. The
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last, Burgos, turned into
an unqualified failure. He did
not
capture the fortress and lost
more than 2,000 allied

soldiers dead in the failed
effort.'

Ciudad Rodrig n

The French believed that the British
had gone into
winter quarters in December, 1811, to
regroup from the
efforts of that year's campaigns, which
had included the
failed first and second sieges of Badajoz.«
In the autumn
of 1811 Wellington enlisted Major
Alexander Dickson, his

most able artillery advisor, and entrusted
him to assemble
and transport a massive siege train from the
Atlantic coast
of Portugal to Ciudad Rodrigo. The new siege
train consisted

mainly of new iron guns and howitzers of English cast.'
The determined and innovative Dickson used barges to bring
the guns up the Duoro, as far as Lamego. From there,

hundreds of mule, bullock and oxen teams, with wagoners,
took the artillery overland to Almeida. Near there the

British assembled the siege train, with ammunition,

a

task

they had completed by December, 1811. The entire project
took longer than three months. "The bringing of sixty-eight
huge guns, with proportionate stores, across fifty miles of

mountain was an operation of magnitude;" wrote Sir William
Napier,

"five thousand draft bullocks were required for the
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train alone, and above

a

thousand militia were for several

weeks employed merely to
repair the road."- The British
were able to keep all of
their considerable efforts to
assemble this formidable siege
train a secret
from the

French. Wellington's officers
knew that surprise was the key
to the operation. Major
Edward C. Cocks, an intelligence
officer, wrote to his father:

occupied in preparation for
Rodrigo. Marmont has%ne ?o
ValenMr.°' '''^^f^
^^^^^
if what I
hear Ce t^n/^^'^^ ^^S'^^^ ^^^^"^^
t°
"^""^
interrupt us. He
r^^^K
probably presumed that we should not
attempt
^^-timpu a siege
sieqe at
this season of the year.^^
^-^-^

•

'

The British commander in chief invested
Ciudad Rodrigo
between 7 and 10 January 1812. The fortress,
of modern

design, had been much battered during the
course of the
war.^^

It was also weakly garrisoned. The new
siege train

quickly reduced two sections of the curtain wall to
rubble.
During this same period, British infantry dug a series
of

trenches and saps that allowed the allies to approach the
citadel under cover. The engineers declared the two
breaches, a main one to the right and a smaller one to the
left, sufficiently wide to favor an assault on the 19th,

less than two weeks after the arrival of the besiegers."

Nevertheless, a French force under the command of Marmont
had learned of the siege and had already reached Salamanca.
The allies had to take Ciudad Rodrigo before he arrived to

overwhelm them and lift the siege. Wellington ordered the
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assault for the evening of
the 19th, as soon as there
was
enough darkness to cover
the attack.- The soldiers
greeted the news with relief,
glad they could leave the
trenches they had recently
carved out of the frozen soil,
and anxious to be done with
living like frozen moles.
Private William Wheeler revealed
the troopers' sentiments:
d^ty were not only exposed
to the cold^winH^
^""^ ""^^^ '"''^^ annoyed by the frequent
visit? nf
""^^ we could hear the roaring of\he
gins at Ldrf^r
heartily wished the place
deduced.^

That evening the forlorn hope, the
small vanguard who
first approached the smaller breach,
was led by Lieutenant
John Gurwood. Despite a wound to the
head, Gurwood advanced
steadily amidst a terrible fire. He managed
to reach the
fortress's governor and accept his sword in
surrender.

General Thomas Picton's 3rd Division poured through
the
larger breach on the right and the British swiftly
occupied
the town. From beginning to end Wellington's siege had

required twelve days. Two years earlier, in 1810, Marshal
Michel Ney had used

a full

allied victory came at

a

month to do the same thing. The

price of heavy casualties, as did

most sieges. Wellington lost 1,000 men to the French 500. He
took 2,000 enemy prisoners.

Wellington's swift work thwarted French attempts to
relieve their besieged comrades. He took Ciudad Rodrigo

before the French armies, barely assembled at Salamanca from
their scattered winter quarters throughout Castile, could

move to save it. The
Anglo-Portuguese army now possessed
the
northern gateway of Spain.
Wellington had behaved patiently,
waiting for the siege train so
ably managed by Dickson. But
the lieutenant general had
acted decisively too, seizing the
opportunity to attack in the middle
of the cold, mountain
winter.

T he Third Sieg e of BadRjn7

Following the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo,
Wellington set
off, with only a small part of his staff,
for Badajoz in the
south.
time.

He intended to besiege Badajoz for the third

This time he hoped to achieve it with the army of

General Sir Rowland Hill, encamped in the vicinity
of

Elvas."

Twice before, but only once under Wellington's

direct supervision, the allies had besieged the city in
1811. At the time they lacked any decent siege guns and the

approach of relieving French armies had forced them to

withdraw before they could finish the job. "Since our return
to Penamacor," Private Wheeler wrote, "we have been employed
in assisting the battering train from Saba Gal to Castala

Branco.
so,

I

understand the train is on the road to Elvas. If

Baddajos is the next place to be reduced."^*
General Wellington, lacking adequate transport, could

only send

a small

portion of the siege train from Ciudad

Rodrigo:

sixteen 24-pdrs and the same
number of 24-pdr
howitzers.
while the besiegers had fewer
guns available
at Badajoz than at Ciudad
Rodrigo, they still had better
artillery than at the two previous
failed efforts. The Royal
Navy, furthermore, reluctantly
agreed to send some
additional large-bore guns along
the less demanding route
from Lisbon.
The third siege of Badajoz had to
succeed quickly, if
it did not, relieving French
armies could assault the
besiegers. The allies had to work against
the fortress and
against time. But tight schedules do not
make for efficient
sieges. The fortress at Badajoz, furthermore,
was larger,

stronger and more heavily garrisoned than that
at Ciudad
Rodrigo, making it a tougher place to take.==
Badajoz was well-suited to repel attack from the north,
protected, as it was, by the River Guadiana, a waterway that
ran 300-500 yards wide. The nearest usable bridge, at

Merida, lay 30 miles to the east of Badajoz."' The original
fortress, an old Moorish castle, overlooked the river from

the high ground in the northeast corner, where steep cliffs
ran down to the waterside. A wall, built in 1757, enlarged
the fortified area by several times. A curtain wall and

eight bastions guarded the main fortress. The bastions

reached up to 30 feet, the curtain five to eight feet lower.
Outer works consisted of the Picurina Fort to the southeast,
the Pardaleras fort to the southwest

Badajoz
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and the San Roque Lunette,
which guarded the bridge across
the Rivallas Brook to the
east. A significant hill .ass,
San
Cristobal, to the north-northwest
of the town, rose more
than one hundred feet above
the river. Another fortress,
built upon that promontory,
intended to deny the commanding
heights to an attacking enemy.

Wellington had studied the French siege
of Badajoz of
1811, which had succeeded. The Gallic
attack had focused on
the Pardaleras fort but the British
commander refused to
repeat that tactic. His engineers
recommended assaulting the
old castle, their plan little changed
from the two failed
attempts of the year before.- That idea,
too, the general
rejected. Wellington opted instead for an
assault across the
marshy lowground to the southeast, near the
Trinidad
bastion, one of the eight at Badajoz. The British
general

preferred that site, according to the premier siege
historian of the Peninsular War, Sir John Jones, because
"the counterguard in front of the right angle of the bastion
of La Trinidad had been left in an unfinished state.

Wellington may also have chosen La Trinidad in order to
surprise the French, hoping they had left only a small force
to defend it. The commander in chief could ill afford to

remain outside Badajoz for too long, lest the French

coalesce and with their vastly superior numbers converge on
his sieging force. The French garrison knew that

a

powerful

siege executed via the Pardaleras fort could succeed, since

they had done it in
18n. The two earlier British efforts
had both focused on the
old castle, by way of San
Cristobal.
It is reasonable to assume
that the French would not expect
an attack frcn across the
marshes to their south. If they
did, surely they would have
either completed the

construction of the wall in that
area or at least buttressed
it. But they had done neither.
The allied siege train arrived
from Ciudad Rodrigo in
late March of 1812. The assistance
provided by the Royal
Navy, less than promised, had
forced Major Dickson to
augment his cannon force with whatever
he could scrounge at
Elvas. The artilleryman was able to
bring 20 guns of

variable caliber and manufacture to Badajoz.
This mongrel
collection included bronze Russian 18-pdrs and
an assortment
of seventeenth-century pieces of questionable
value:

"In

general there was room between the shot and the bore to
put
a man's finger in," the

historian Jones observed.^''

That

many of the bores of these guns were of non-standard

diameter made the already difficult task of resupplying

ammunition even more challenging. Clearly, one would not
expect much accuracy from these batteries. With the
artillery, such as it was, at last present, the engineers

could finally begin their work against La Trinidad.
They began construction of their trenches and batteries

under cannon fire from the Picurina fort, a mere 400 yards
from the Trinidad bastion. To stop this harassment and
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operate their guns safely,
once e.placed, the British had
to
take Picurina. They carried
it on 25 March at a cost of
sixty percent casualties out
of a storming party of 250.The guns then found their way
into the batteries and
began pummeling the curtain and
the bastion, while the
howitzers lobbed explosive shells
over the walls. By 5 April
the firing had created two breaches,
one in the bastion and
the other in the curtain wall to
its southwest. The
engineers deemed them practicable on the
5th, but Wellington
ordered a third breach. The artillery
achieved it as well,
at the juncture of the right side
of the Trinidad bastion
where it met the curtain wall. On 6 April
the commander in
chief ordered an assault at 7 p.m. Delays
caused the

schedule to be pushed back three hours until ten
p.m. During
those three hours the artillery eased their fire,
believing
the assault already to have begun earlier. The French
used

the reprieve to shore up the gaps in the walls and load
them

with deadly obstacles.
The plan of the assault called for the Light Division
and the 4th Division to storm the three breaches between
them, with the Light Division on the left. The 3rd Division

should sneak north around the San Roque Lunette, traverse
the Rivalles Brook at the Mill Dam and go over the curtain
wall, near the castle, by escalade. Meanwhile, to the north,

the 5th Division should attempt to climb the walls east of
the San Vicente bastion. To facilitate the operations of the
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3rd and 5th divisions
(escalades could be very bloody),

Wellington ordered a diversionary
attack on the Tete du Pont
fortress, on the north bank
of the Guadiana.
At 10 pm. the attack began.
The 3rd, 4th and Light
divisions Charged into a
maelstrom of fire. A survivor of
that terrible night. Major
George Simmons of the 95th
Rifles, described his attack
into hell:

columns moved on under a most
grape that mowed down our men like dreadful
the Pallisading and got upon the grass We
g^aci^. My
can?.fr^was shot in the mouth. Eight
captain
or ten officers
^° ^^^^ "°
Ladderf :4re
resteruoonTh"""^'"'/"''
^°\^"terscarp from within the ditch.
nnwn^h^^
t
Down
these we hurried,
and as fast as we got down
0^°''''^'''^ ^°
breaches, where a most frightful
^r^nf
scene of carnage was going on. Fifty
times they [the
French] were stormed, and as often
without effect, the
French cannon sweeping the ditches with
a most
destructive fire. The ditch, from the place
where we
entered near the top of the breaches, was
covered with
dead and dying soldiers. If a man fell
wounded, ten to
one that he ever rose again, for the volleys
of
musketry and grapeshot that were incessantly poured
amongst us made our situation too horrid for
description. I had seen some fighting, but nothing like
this. We remained passively here to be slaughtered
as
we could do the besieged little injury from the
ditch.
fir-c.
fire

^-F
of

The thundering fire of the French defenders stopped the
4th and Light divisions cold, inflicting them with

staggering casualties. The 3rd Division under the crusty
Picton, however, managed to carry the castle. General Sir

James Leith's 5th Division saved the night. Attacking the
San Vincente bastion under fierce fire from above, the

redcoats pressed their way forward relentlessly. They

brought up their ladders, scaled them and hurtled over the
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walls. A junior officer
in Leith's division described
how
they managed the seemingly
impossible:

surrounded by a
requla^^d?"?nh^^\^^ ''^^^^
l^^^
^^^^^
^° descent but
ii?h
assistance of the ladders which we
carried
and the
th^ rampart itself,
nearly 30 ft hiah wi^h

^

occasion to such as we were not
interfered Cith ^
time before we
cou^d ^^?=v.V K
f°°ting upon the rampart, but.
!
Se h^/?^
lifted, four regimeAts inti
T:he town
?he
?own before
h^r' midnight. '°
.

Picton joined Leith and Badajoz belonged
to Wellington.
After the siege, Wellington viewed the
carnage at the
breaches. All told, he had suffered almost
5,000 casualties.
To the great surprise of his staff, their
stoic leader lost
his almost mythical self-control and wept.
The next day he

penned his report to Lord Liverpool, the minister of
war:
"The capture of Badajoz affords as strong an instance
of the

gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. But
greatly hope that

I

I

shall never again be the instrument of

putting them to such a test."^'
He had been the instrument. To him belonged the

victory. To him also fell the responsibility for the price
of that victory. His plan of attack disregarded the advice

of the engineering officers, whom he liked and admired as

men, but in whose professional abilities he had little

confidence.

"Our engineers, though brave and well-

educated," he wrote, "have never turned their mind to the
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mode Of conducting

a

regular siege.-,

^hat plan included

two escalades, in addition
to storming the breaches,
and the
"diversions", not the main assault,
succeeded.
He attacked Badajoz,
significantly stronger than Ciudad
Rodrigo, with less than half of
the artillery power he had

employed against the northern
citadel.
Wellington acted as
his own chief of staff for
engineering matters. He ordered
his attack prematurely, before
the breaches were truly
practicable. In part he felt he had to
do so because the
French armies rapidly bore down on
Badajoz to relieve the
beleaguered city. But having made the decision,
he should
have gotten his men into position on time,
especially with
time at a premium. Instead, for one reason
or another, he

delayed moving against the breaches for three
hours after
the scheduled departure, a delay that allowed the
defenders
to regroup and prepare to repel the attackers.
The siege of

Badajoz, ultimately successful, cost him five times the

losses he had suffered at Ciudad Rodrigo.

Burgos

On 22 July 1812 Lord Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army

shattered the French Army of Portugal at the battle of
Salamanca, arguably the finest offensive operation conducted
by the future field marshal.

Following that astounding
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success, however, ca.e a
dile..a. if he pursued the
re.nants
Of the Ar.y of Portugal,
the other French forces would
.ost
certainly unite and, in their
lessened but still greater
strength, destroy the allies.
So, like Napoleon in the day s
before Waterloo, Wellington
tried to catch and engage singl e
enemy armies. For that reason,
he marched to Madrid to try
to lure Marshal Soult's small
Army of the Centre into
battle. Soult would have none of
it and fled. Wellington's

Anglo-Portuguese force, victorious but
exhausted after
Salamanca, occupied the capital city of
Spain, now devoid of
enemy soldiers. Meanwhile, the other
French armies worked to
recover and regroup. The Army of Portugal,
somewhat
reconstituted after their drubbing at Salamanca,
began to
demonstrate in the Duoro River valley. The Army
of the

North, farther to the northeast, moved westward
toward the

Army of Portugal, in early September Wellington moved
out of

Madrid toward Burgos hoping to block the union of those
two
French forces. He now chose to besiege the fortress, and the

Anglo-Portuguese army invested Burgos on 19 September 1812.
The siege of Burgos seemed doomed from the beginning.

The twin operations of Badajoz and Salamanca had thinned

heavily the ranks of the best divisions of Wellington's
army: the 3rd, 4th, 5th and Light. The commander in chief

had left them in Madrid to rest and had taken with him less

experienced units, thinking of Burgos as only a minor
operation. The Anglo-Portuguese had only three 18-pdr
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battering guns with a paltry
1,306 round shot. The rest had
not caught up from the
previous campaigns and Wellington
did
not expect them for several
weeks. 3^ Against those three
guns stood a very stout
fortress the strength of which the
British commander grossly
underrated:
"it was not unlike a
hill fort in India, and I had
got into a good many of
them."- He could scarcely have
been more wrong. The works
at Burgos were awesome. No
hill fort, it had a triple
layer

of defenses and a formidable
battery of artillery. The first
layer, or wall system, around the
old keep, included a

casemated battery built at Napoleon's
direction. The second
and third layers, concentric walls with
modern parapets,
revetments and ravelins covered every approach.
The
logistical depot for the Army of the North, it
contained
more than ample supplies. Wellington soon began
to realize
that Burgos would be no easy job, contrary to his
initial
expectations. Between the obviously formidable fort and his
own dearth of proper siege equipment he became, in his own
words,

"A little apprehensive that

take this castle.

I

have not the means to

"^^

Uncharacteristically, he now vacillated. He did not

withdraw but neither did he press home a full-scale assault.
The general, now an earl, began a series of disjointed and

fragmented attacks that signified both
a

lack of confidence. As early as

5

lack of mission and

October the earl had

remarked that, "our final success is.
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a

.

.doubtful.", but he

.

nonetheless continued the
assaults through 18 October."
With the Armies of Portugal
and the North closing in on
hi.,
Wellington abandoned the
operation on 21 October. The AngloPortuguese army then had to
retreat in a headlong rush
to

Portugal
Understandably, Wellington's stock
dropped with
everyone, but especially with his
troops. When he had
visited some of his soldiers in
the hospital after the
battle of Albuera which followed the
failed first siege of
Badajoz, where he had not commanded
personally, they had
said:
"If you had commanded us, my Lord,
there wouldn't be
so many of us here."- After Burgos
a more common

sentiment was: "if ever a man ruined himself,

[Wellington]

has done it. For the last two months he has
acted like a
madman."^'

The siege failed abjectly. It cost over 2,000 lives
for

no apparent gain. Why? Lady Longford believes exhaustion

brought on by too many years of war caused the earl's

unorthodox and uncharacteristic behavior. *° Wellington's
tendency to do everything for himself certainly lends
credence to the Longford thesis. Michael Glover argues that
while a tactical failure, the siege at Burgos brought
strategic advantages. By forcing the Armies of Portugal and
the North to come to the aid of Burgos, the future field

marshal allowed the guerrillas of Navarre and the Basque

country to wrest control of their provinces away from the
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French, thereby enabling
the spring offensive of 1813.
That
conclusion, however, reaches
beyond the available facts.
Glover's contention that the
"fiasco at Burgos led directly
to the victory at Vitoria,"
may be true.- But did
Wellington so plan it? Did he
consciously believe his siege
of Burgos would free Navarre
and the Basque country?
if so,

Wellington's official dispatches and
personal correspondence
do not so demonstrate. Surely
he would have tried
to

mitigate the debacle if he had the
means. Instead he said:
"It was entirely my own act.— He
seemed to have had no
master strategic plan in mind when he
invested the fortress.
Burgos was a tragic defeat born of
over-extended lines, poor
preparation and, as Lady Longford avers, a general
much in
need of a rest. Sir John Fortescue, in his
Historv of thP

British Army wrote:

.

.the abortive siege of Burgos was

the most unsatisfactory operation on Wellington's
part

during the whole of the Peninsular War."*^
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CHAPTER

5

THE CONSUMMATE FIELD MARSHAL

The Concl usion of th^ Pe ninsulai-

w^r-

After the defensive campaign of 1809
through 1811, sir
Arthur's detractors called him cautious
and timid. Following
the very sanguine sieges of 1812,
these same pundits accused
him of being rash to a fault. ^ Wellington's
army almost
disintegrated during the retreat to Portugal
following
Burgos, a development that the earl found
intolerable:
The officers lost all control over their men.
Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were
committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained
which ought never to have occurred.
.1 have no
hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual
inattention of the officers of the regiments to their
duties
.

A reaffirmation of order and discipline ensued as the

peninsular army went into its winter quarters near Ciudad
Rodrigo. Signally, Wellington probably committed himself

this time to the offense for his next campaign.
In the spring of 1813 the allied army again sallied

forth into Spain, but this time under far more favorable

circumstances than in the past. First, the British had
poured reinforcements into Portugal throughout the winter.
The forces now under Wellington's command numbered over
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.

200,000.3

That nu.ber included, after
22 September 1812,
the armies of Spain after
the Junta bestowed the title of
Generalissimo of the Spanish
Armies upon the British
general. The French forces,
on the other hand, had shrunk
to
a little over 230,000.
For the first time the allies
would
operate in an environment of virtual
parity with the
imperial armies."

Wellington decided to advance along
the Salamanca road
from Ciudad Rodrigo and, on 22 May
began the march eastward.
The French fled before him. The
Gallic armies were war-weary
and unreinforced because of Napoleon's
greater problems in
Russia.- The French abandoned Burgos,
Wellington's nemesis
of 1812, under pressure from the allied
juggernaut. Farther

and harder the earl pushed his army, across
the difficult

and unforgiving terrain of northern Spain. In
fewer than 30

days the allied force marched almost 300 miles and
found

intself in position to attack Bilbao, Vitoria or both.
King
Joseph, Napoleon's brother, chose to offer battle at

Vitoria
The southern portion of the allied field force, that

closest to Vitoria, arrived near the city on the evening of
20 June 1813. Almost immediately the British commander-in

-chief recognized that King Joseph, who had taken command

from his brother's marshals, was over-extended and

disorganized. The French mustered some 55,000 men stretched

along

a

twelve mile front, while the king directed his
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.

energies toward dispatching
his amassed booty safely over
the Pyrenees. into this
chaos Wellington brought 80,000
^
footsore and irate troops
determined to make the ^Frenchies'
pay for the discomfort caused
by the lengthy
march.'

The British Lion who had
defeated the Tiger of Mysore
could finally attack. He
ordered a simultaneous threepronged assault. First, General
Thomas Graham's 20,000 men
would hit Joseph from the north.
From the southwest. General
Hill's 20,000 troops should descend
upon the Imperial forces
from the Puebla heights. The largest
force, 30,000 men
grouped into four divisions, would charge
from the west: the
3rd and 7th Divisions to the north
near Mendoza; the Light
Division at Tres Puentes; Cole's 4th near
Nanclares; and
Wellington's column just to the south of Villodas.
The

balance of the allied force, some 10,000, would
form the
reserve
The operation worked as planned. The simultaneous

attacks from the north, west and southwest completely

overwhelmed the French. King Joseph had no option but to
run, and flee he did. For their part, the allies did not

pursue the retreating French army as they should have.
Nevertheless, the

^

Sepoy General', as Napoleon disparagingly

referred to Wellington, was after Vitoria the unquestioned
champion of Spain. Following that battle, the government

honored Wellington with the highest military rank it could
bestow: field marshal.
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Vitoria

Throughout the balance of 1813 and the first part of
1814, Sir Arthur pushed the French further and further back

over the Pyrenees. The Peninsular War ended on 10 April
1814, after the battle of Toulouse. On

3

May 1814 the

British commander attained the highest rank in the peerage
when he became the Duke of Wellington.
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on

The Duke of Wellington's
prosecution of the Peninsular
war smacks of military genius.
He did not enjoy parity of
numbers until 1813, five years
into the conflict, yet he not
only avoided defeat during that
time, but also made

remarkable progress against the
veteran French armies. To be
sure, the British general had
help, not the least of which
came from the French marshals. A
sniping and jealous group,
they bungled many opportunities to
unite and crush the
allies because of petty envy and
adolescent
intrigues.

Wellington, thanks to his intelligence
network, usually knew
of the movements of the separate
French forces and retired
quickly when they infrequently united.
Additionally,
as the

war progressed, Napoleon removed large numbers
of troops
from Iberia, especially before his march to
Moscow in 1812.
Conversely, the British, buoyed by both their army's

intermittent success and Napoleon's setbacks, finally began
to reinforce significantly the peninsular army.
By 1813, at the start of the allied push to the

Pyrenees, they actually outnumbered the French in the field.
Even though King Joseph's various armies numbered 230,000 in

early 1813, many of these soldiers needed to occupy the

hostile countryside, garrison the cities and perform other

ancillary duties that kept them out of the field formations.
The duke, on the other hand, could put as many men into the
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field as his commissaries
could support. The fact remains,
however, that the allies
were hugely outnumbered for
five'
years. Yet they and their
general endured. He probed and
tested but refused to engage
decisively the numerically
superior French unless at the
time and place of his own
choosing, as at Vimiero, Bussaco
and Salamanca. The field
marshal fought a war of attrition
waiting patiently for the
emperor to deplete his own forces.

Coalition Warrinr-

Sir Arthur possessed an attitude and
philosophy aptly
suited to his situation as commander of a
multi-national
force. In the Peninsula, as in India, the
field marshal

commanded several different forces, speaking several

different languages, intent on several different purposes.
One could scarcely expect the Iron Duke to manage a
decent

military parade from such

a

hodge-podge, yet by carefully

culling his officer corps for acceptable generals and
colonels who fit into the Wellington mold, he managed his

coalitions to victory. Coalition warfare requires the

coalition commander to trust and believe his alliance can
achieve victory. The nucleus of the alliance must also trust
in the competence of the commander. A successful coalition

operation requires these two conditions. As they were

present in World War ll
with Eisenhower and the Persian
Culf
war with Schwarzkopf, so
too with Wellington. As a
young
colonel in India, sir Arthur
successfully formed two
alliances, the first with
the Nizam of Hyderabad against
the
Mysoreans and the second with
a number of princely states
against the Mahrattas. He
learned in the subcontinent always
to keep a nucleus of seasoned
and thoroughly reliable troops
(usually British) under his
direct control. In Iberia
the

Anglo-Portuguese coalition alternately
flourished and waned
throughout 1808 and 1809. After Talavera,
however, the

bilateral trust crucial to the success
of the joint force
grew and cemented the alliance. It was
the Anglo-Portuguese
army that provided the seasoned,
reliable core during the
lean years before 1813.
Besides trust, patience and diplomacy form
important

components of successful alliances. The duke possessed
an
abundance of both, but not enough to overcome the titanic
egos of the Spanish generals. No amount of coaxing
or

cajoling could move the Spanish to follow any plan framed
by
anyone other than one of their own. Aggrieved because

Wellington would subscribe to neither Spanish tactics nor
authority, the Anglo-Spanish martial union did not happen
until the Spanish Junta appointed him Generalissimo of the

Spanish armies on 22 September 1812. Thereafter the allied
army was, in fact, Wellington's army.
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Tactics

The field marshal
generally adhered to the tactical
norms of the day. He was
not an experimenter. An
infantry
commander, the duke believed
in the cavalry, artillery
and
engineers as ancillary branches
whose purpose was to assist
and augment the operations
of the foot soldiers. He
distilled the best of General
David Dundas' Rules and
Regulations for the movement of
His Majesty^s Infantry,
discipline and drill, and applied
it remorselessly.'
The
infantry weapon of the day was the
notoriously inaccurate
musket, but at four rounds per
minute, a thin red line could
certainly produce a lethal wall of
lead. Wellington

understood that fact, and so he drilled
his units until they
were exhausted, and then he drilled them
some more. He

emphasized not fancy maneuvers but repeated
formation into
line from column and interminable musket
drill. His soldiers
needed to perform almost automatically. This
performance,

matched to the discipline that is the hallmark of
British
infantry, made the 33rd in India and, later, the
peninsular

army virtually unbeatable.
As support for infantry, the cavalry and artillery

performed useful service. The cavalry anchored the flanks of
his defensive formations and exploited enemy retreats by

pursuit. Wellington liked to have cavalry buttress his

defensive wings because in that role they augmented his
114

.

infantry. As pursuers,
he found them less satisfactory,
almost every charge they
lost control of their formations
and went galloping off
into the countryside providing
little
support for the force as a
whole. Even as late as 1815 a
cavalry assault at Waterloo
went out of control. The Union
and Household Brigades charged
forward heroically and
restored the lines that Napoleon's
troops had bulged, but
they did not stop there. They
continued forward: "all dash,"
wrote a young officer, until they
found themselves caught in
the enemy rear, where the French
cut them off and massacred

m

them.-

The Scots Greys lost 297 of their 300
men and, in

all, Wellington lost over 2,500
cavalrymen in that one

charge
The duke had somewhat better experience
with the

artillery. Throughout his peninsular campaigns
he utilized

more and more cannon to greater and greater effect.
The
influx of dependable, well-manufactured iron guns from

England made his increased use of artillery possible. The

hybrid batteries he had to employ before 1812 lacked

a

standard caliber and proved of questionable quality. But as
his batteries became standardized, he no longer had to

transport a virtual warehouse of artillery ammunition to
supply many different caliber guns and could better utilize
his limited transport to bring more and more guns to the

battlefield.

115

Finally, the duke mastered
logistics. He understood the
connection between supply and
performance in the field. A
well-fed, well-Clothed,
well-armed force, given discipline
and leadership, ought to
beat one lacking those essentials.
Wellington knew that better than
any other general of his
era. Napoleon certainly never
concerned himself overly with
the welfare of his troops. He
had a nearly inexhaustible
supply of privates. The duke usually
faced armies greatly
superior in numbers, and so he had to
work to husband his
soldiers as best he could. Woe to the
commissary who failed
to deliver rations. Heaven help
the officer who did not
properly house his soldiers whenever possible.
Wellington's

redcoats not only believed that he would lead
them to
victory with as few casualties as possible, but
that he also
would take care of their essential needs while
doing so. The

newly-promoted Segeant Wheeler wrote:
If England should require the service of her
army again, and I should be with it, let me have "Old

Nosey" to command. Our interests would be sure to be
looked into, we should never have occasion to fear an
enemy. There are two things we should be certain of.
First, we should always be as well supplied with
rations as the nature of the service would admit. The
second is we should be sure to give the enemy a d
d
good thrashing. What can a soldier desire more."

Intelligence

The field marshal's success in his limited operations

between 1808 and 1813 owed in part to the intelligence
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network he established. A
sympathetic populace contributed
critically to that intelligence
system. Operating in a
friendly environment enabled
Sir Arthur to nurture thousands
Of part-time information
sources. The French, by contrast,
battled day and night with a
nation of fifth columnists.
Further, Wellington's relationship
with the guerrillas
proved extremely beneficial as
well to British intelligence
efforts. The guerrillas waged
myriad, constant little
campaigns against them, rarely allowing
them to rest. While
the guerrillas slaked their thirst
for vengeance against the
hated French by killing the messengers
who streamed between
French armies, Wellington received the
dispatches
and

communiques taken from the bodies of the
unfortunate
messengers. Finally, not only was communication
between

France and Spain always harassed, but the British
commander
was able to glean, time and again, the intentions
of the
French, courtesy of the captured messages.

Wellington and his Staff

Wellington insisted on doing everything for himself, a
strength, but also a weakness. He conducted personal

reconnaissance whenever possible. All orders issued directly
from him. Every aspect of every operation, down to the

smallest detail he made his responsibility alone. He refused
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to delegate. One of the
roost basic of all military
tenets,
however, is that a commander
should train and develop
subordinates. Wellington failed
to do that. If he had been
killed during the course of
the Peninsular War, before
1813,
it is doubtful that any
of Wellington's lieutenants
could
have come forward to lead the
army competently. The Iron
Duke never trained his subordinate
commanders or staff to
operate with initiative.
As a matter of fact, he often
castigated subordinates
who acted of their own volition.
When Doctor James McGrigor,

Wellington's chief inspector of hospitals,
changed the
evacuation route for the wounded after the
battle of
Salamanca, the duke flew into a rage:
shall be glad to know who is to command the
army? I or you? I establish one route.
.you establish
another, and order the commissariat and the supplies
by
that line. As long as you live. Sir, never do
so again;
never do anything without my orders.
I

.

This insistence on control in part accounted for the

notorious failure of his armies to pursue fleeing enemies.

Lieutenant Colonel William Tomkinson averred that the
field marshal was jealous of any British success outside of
his immediate purview:

"Lord Wellington may not like to

entrust officers with detachments to act according to
circumstances, and

I

am quite clear if he approves of much

success, excepting under his own immediate eye.""
One must temper Colonel Tomkinson 's sentiment with the

proven indisciplined performance of Wellington's cavalry, of
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Which Tomkinson was a part,
and the often inferior quality
Of the British Officer
corps. Many men entered the army
because, as second or third
sons of noblemen, they had no
other place to go. Wellington
proved himself one of the few
exceptions in the army of that
era. Few officers applied
themselves as diligently and
tirelessly to excellence. One
of the reasons the duke did
everything for himself was
to

protect his men from the incompetence
of many of the
officers assigned to lead them.
A member of the Third Dragoons, Captain
William Bragge
penned a succinct assessment of the field
marshal's dilemma
with respect to his officers. After the
retreat from Burgos
Wellington had thrown a stinging remonstrance
at his

subordinates in the form of

a

Circular to Officers

Commanding Divisions and Brigades (See Note #2). The
London
newspapers got hold of it, and, of course, and perhaps
with
glee, published it without permission. Bragge wrote:

I was very sorry to see Lord Wellington's
Letter to his Generals commanding Brigades and
Divisions [of 28th Nov.] at full length in the rascally
London Newspapers with suitable remarks by the Editors,
one of whom cooly observes the Army was in a state of
Mutiny and the Retreat more dreadful than that of the
French through Russia. My own opinion is that Lord
Wellington never wished or intended the aforesaid
Letter to be published, nor was it, I believe, in many
instances read to the Troops but to the Officers only.
It was perhaps rather too violent and never would have
been necessary had his Lordship proper General Officers
under him or Men of his own choosing. At present the
Ministers or Duke of York order out a batch of
Generals, who in general have neither Talent nor
Experience. Some blunder is committed. Lord Wellington
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thinv
think i„
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quick"; till
incalc^ able
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—
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f
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returned to England after doing
cniiT
~K^^ Mischief instead of
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saving seve?al
Millions a Year, for which purpose
he was sent out.-

^""^^y ^^^^P^ Sir

S.

The Consummat e Field Marshal

With Vitoria, Wellington had come full circle.
From the
defense at Boxtel the audacious assault at Assaye,
the
,

stand at Torres Vedras, to the overwhelming of King
Joseph,
the duke displayed absolute command of whatever
battlefield

milieu in which he found himself. The only blemish on his
record related to sieges, and even there he can hardly be

called

a loser.

Wellington came to Iberia as an offensive general,

comfortable in the belief that his Indian experiences would
easily transfer to the new theater of operations. He had
analyzed the French tactics and was certain he could defeat
them. Circumstances forced him to become a more cautious

general, a master of the defense. That experience, combined
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with the .ixed success
of the siege campaign,
enabled hi. to
grow beyond the strictly
offensive or defensive for^s
of
generalship and become a field
marshal in every sense of the
word. The duke once caln
i„
said, ht
"i look
upon Salamanca, Vitoria
and Waterloo as my best
battles. ..... Audaciousness,
alacrity and risk went into
all three of those actions. Not
coincidentally Salamanca and Vitoria
occurred after his
siege campaign of 1812. The field
marshal's education was
complete.
i

Many historians portray Waterloo
as the centerpiece of
Wellington's career, it was certainly an
event of great
significance in the course of European history,
especially
since it finally pitted Wellington
against Napoleon. Yet the

battle itself offered no new tactics or
challenges. As the
duke himself said: "Napoleon did not maneuver
at all. He

just moved forward in the old style and was
driven off in

the old style.

"'^
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